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I. INTRODUCTION
In both the United States and England, accident victims, even in
cases of small fender benders, are often entitled to compensation from
negligent defendants, and, realistically, the defendants' liability in-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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surers. Accident claimants in the two countries, however, have differ-
ent ways of funding their claims and litigation. In the United States,
claimants use the American-style contingent fee agreement to pay for
lawyers. The agreements are contingent in that a lawyer only gets
paid if her client prevails. They are "American-style" in that the law-
yer's fee is an agreed percentage of the recovered damages. In En-
gland,1 claimants have relied on legal aid and the two-way cost-
shifting "English Rule," pursuant to which a prevailing party can re-
cover his solicitor's fees and litigation costs, including counsel's fees,
from the losing litigant. 2
Over the last decade, there have been dramatic changes in the En-
glish litigation funding system for many areas of law, particularly per-
sonal injury (with the exception, to date, of clinical negligence). The
English eliminated legal aid and suddenly introduced the conditional
fee agreement, a type of contingent fee to be explained infra, without
changing the English Rule. 3 One commentator has argued that a con-
tingent fee system and the English Rule are logically incompatible
and analogized this dramatic shift to having an American hamburger
stand in St. Paul's Cathedral.4 Between 2000 and 2003, there were
constant disputes, as claimants and their representatives pushed the
new rules to the outer limits and defendant liability insurance compa-
nies resisted in any way they could. Some have likened the period to
one of "guerrilla warfare."5
This Article will explain the contentious debate. Part II will com-
pare the American and the traditional English way of funding per-
sonal injury litigation, particularly minor road accident cases. Part
III will discuss some background factors that influenced the recent
changes in England. Part IV will examine the first revised litigation
funding system, and Part V will demonstrate how the development of
1. This Article applies equally to England and Wales. The author simply refers to
England for convenience. There are two branches of the English legal profession.
Solicitors constitute one branch. Statutes, regulations and the Law Society gov-
ern them with a rigorous set of regulatory and ethical rules. Solicitors frequently
instruct independent barristers for legal expertise, legal opinions, and advocacy.
Barristers, often called counsel, are members of the Bar. At present, the Bar
Council is the primary regulatory body. As a general rule, a lay client may only
directly instruct a solicitor. Since much of this Article focuses on the relationship
between client and professional, the author will primarily address issues related
to solicitors.
2. Additionally, membership associations, such as labor unions, have played a large
role in assisting claimants in bringing their actions.
3. "The shift from anathematizing to idealizing conditional fees was sudden and
rapid." Richard L. Abel, An American Hamburger Stand in St. Paul's Cathedral:
Replacing Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury Litigation,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 303 (2001).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Michael Zander, Where Are We Heading with the Funding of Civil Liti-
gation?, 22 CIv. JUST. Q. 23, 34 (2003).
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
after-the-event insurance, to be explained infra, and the second re-
vised litigation funding system ameliorated some problems, but gener-
ated new ones. Part VI will discuss the consequences of the second
revised litigation funding system, with particular emphasis on the de-
velopment of claims management companies, the extensive satellite
litigation and, where appropriate, comparisons to the United States
Supreme Court's resolution of similar problems. Part VII will con-
clude by noting that there is now a moment of repose in the struggle,
but no guarantee that dramatic disagreement will not, in one form or
another, reappear.
II. AMERICAN AND TRADITIONAL ENGLISH LITIGATION
FUNDING SYSTEMS
Accident victims in the United States often retain a professional
lawyer to assist them in pursuing their claims. Although there are lay
negotiators in some jurisdictions, they are not common, and in many
places they are prohibited by broad interpretations of "unauthorized
practice of law" statutes. 6 Claimants, regardless of their wealth, usu-
ally fund their actions with an American-style contingent fee. These
"no win, no fee" agreements generally assure claimants that if they
should lose, they pay no professional fee, and, if they should win, their
lawyer will be entitled to a percentage of their recovered damages. In
all jurisdictions, these fees must be reasonable and courts have super-
visory powers. In some states, there is little additional regulation,
while in others there are elaborate rules and regulations governing
permissible percentages (that may vary for different stages of the
case), disclosures to the client, and formal documentation.7
As to other litigation costs, such as experts, investigators, and doc-
tors, the traditional rule had been that claimants had to remain ulti-
mately liable for all these expenses.S However, in the past, there often
was a tacit understanding that, at least if the lawyer advanced the
costs, the lawyer would not seek to collect these costs. More recently,
in light of the practice and the desire to make lawsuits affordable, law-
yers can advance these litigation costs on a contingent basis. 9 There
are few litigation funding firms in the United States.O The practice of
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2000); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (1983).
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (1983).
8. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1980) (requiring that
the client remain ultimately liable for the expenses and costs of litigation).
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1983) (permitting the lawyer to
advance costs and expenses of litigation and providing that repayment may be
contingent on the outcome of the case).
10. A litigation funding company advances money to a claimant in exchange for a
percentage of recovered damages, or it may provide a nonrecourse loan, only re-
payable if the claimant should prevail. See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Fi-
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advancing money for litigation costs in exchange for a percentage of
the recovery is troublesome, and many believe these funding agree-
ments constitute champerty and are unenforceable."1
The American-style contingent fee system has always been contro-
versial for a number of reasons. Among the critiques, and those most
relevant to this Article, are:
(1) Conflicts of Interests: The lawyer has an ownership interest
in the lawsuit and the recovery. This aligns the lawyer's
interest with that of his client's. Still, the client's and the
lawyer's interests may diverge. Settlement negotiations are
a common example. The lawyer may be tempted to recom-
mend a quick settlement in order to recover her fee, even
though it would be to the client's advantage to continue the
action.
(2) Strong and Weak Suits: A claimant with a small but merito-
rious case may find it difficult to retain a lawyer. Since the
lawyer's fee will be a percentage of damages, there will be
little incentive for a lawyer to represent the client. On the
other hand, a claimant with a potentially large recovery will
easily find a lawyer, regardless of the merits of his case.
This may encourage meritless, or even fraudulent, lawsuits.
(3) Fees Related to Work Done or Damages and Making the
Claimant Whole: Since American-style contingent fees allow
the lawyer a percentage of the recovered damages, lawyers
may easily achieve a windfall profit. The lawyer may earn
substantial fees for minimal work. Furthermore, prevailing
claimants are never made completely whole. The lawyer
will take her fee out of the client's compensatory recovery.
nancing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 57 (2000) (discussing the law surrounding the emergence of
firms whose business is funding litigation, and arguing that rules against cham-
perty should be eliminated to help make the legal system more just); George
Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: How Much Justice
Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805 (2001) (analyzing the use of contin-
gency fees in the United States, and assessing conditional fee arrangements in
the United Kingdom and the English Rule and American Rule for funding adver-
sarial proceedings); Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invita-
tion to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297 (2002) (examining interests of groups
affected most by changes in litigation funding and suggesting a simplified alter-
native to "champerty not allowed" and "champerty allowed" rules).
11. Maintenance is "the giving of assistance, encouragement or support to litigation
by a person who has no legitimate interest in the litigation nor any motive recog-
nized by the court as justifying the interference," and champerty is "the mainte-
nance of an action in consideration of a promise to give the maintainer a share in
the proceeds or subject matter of the action." LORD CHANCELLOR's DEP'T, CONTIN-
GENCY FEES para. 2.2, at 3, 1989, Cm. 571, at 3 [hereinafter CONTINGENCY FEES].
2004]
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In England, claimants have not traditionally been permitted to
fund accident litigation with contingent fee agreements. These agree-
ments were champertous. Although the Criminal Law Act of 1967
decriminalized champerty, such agreements have, until recently, re-
mained contrary to public policy and unenforceable at common law.
12
Moreover, it was unprofessional for an English lawyer to provide legal
services pursuant to a contingency fee arrangement.
1 3
Claimants traditionally funded their claims privately, with public
legal aid, or with the support of an institutional organization, such as
a labor union.1 4 Privately funded litigation initially placed the entire
burden of fees and expenses on the claimant. However, if the claimant
prevailed, she was entitled to recover her lawyer's fees and other liti-
gation costs from the losing party. Conversely, if she lost, she would
have to pay her own legal costs and, additionally and consistent with
the English Rule, the other side's costs as well.15 This cost-shifting,
litigation funding arrangement is often called the "English Rule." One
important traditional element of the English Rule, that became rele-
vant in the conditional fee agreement and after-the-event insurance
debates, is that recoverable fees and costs must always be
"reasonable."
12. Id. para. 2.3, at 3.
13. See SOLICITORS' PRAc. RULES R. 8(1) (1990), available at http://www.guide-on-
line.lawsociety.org.uk. The Practice Rules provided: "A solicitor who is retained
or employed to prosecute any action, suit or other contentious proceeding shall
not enter into any arrangement to receive a contingency fee in respect of that
proceeding...." Id.; CONTINGENCY FEES, supra note 11, para. 2.4, at 3 (quoting
SOLICITORS' PRAc. RULES R. 8(1) (1988)).
At the time, Rule 18(2)(c) of the Solicitors' Practice Rules defined contingency
fee as "any sum (whether fixed or calculated as a percentage of the proceeds or
otherwise howsoever) payable only in the event of success in the prosecution of
any action, suit or other contentious proceeding." In spite of this prohibition,
some solicitors tacitly or informally agreed to forego the collection of their fee if
their client should lose. This was called taking the case "on spec." Michael
Zander, Will the Revolution in the Funding of Civil Litigation in England Eventu-
ally Lead to Contingency Fees?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 262 (2002).
14. As noted above, not infrequently, membership associations, such as unions, assist
a claimant and his solicitor. The Collective Conditional Fee Agreement is the
form of the conditional fee agreement used by these organizations. This Article
will not explore the issues raised by the institutional assistance and the corre-
sponding Collective Conditional Fee Agreement.
15. Commentators debate the pros and cons of various fee arrangements. The empir-
ical evidence, however, as to the effects of one or another regime are sparse.
In the end, both at the macro and micro level, we are hard pressed to
find strong differences in behavioral patterns that can be tied to fee ar-
rangements. This does not mean that fee arrangements do not matter;
rather, it is indicative of the complexity of the effects of fee arrange-
ments. The various effects tend to cross-cut in significant ways. The
result is often that clear evidence of effects is difficult to find.
Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does
the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1983 (2002).
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There is an elaborate cost-assessment or taxation system designed
to implement the English Rule. Specialized judges, or taxing masters,
resolve disputes over recoverable fees and costs. 16 Of course, most
routine cases settled with respect to damages, fees, and costs. In
these negotiations, recoverable fees and costs may have been an im-
portant part of these negotiations, and there is some evidence that
lawyers did not always aggressively pursue a claimant's case. Tacit
collusion among repeat players, such as solicitors and defendant in-
surance companies, where the companies agree to a high reasonable
fee in exchange for the solicitor's recommendation of a low settlement
amount, may be one reason.
The English Rule has always been controversial for a number of
reasons. Among the critiques, and those most relevant to this Article,
are:
(1) Conflicts of Interests: Most obviously, since the solicitor's fee
does not vary with the recovery, the solicitor may be less
inclined to pursue the claimant's case aggressively. The cli-
ent and the solicitor's interests are not aligned. The solici-
tor may want to increase her hours, not necessarily the
client's damages. Moreover, the solicitor may often be
tempted to recommend settlement with high recoverable
fees and a low damage award.
(2) Strong and Weak Suits: The English Rule is a two-way cost-
shifting rule. If the claimant should lose, he would have to
pay his own solicitor's fees and costs, plus the prevailing
party's solicitor's fees and costs. Some risk-averse claim-
ants, regardless of how meritorious their cases, are thereby
discouraged from pursuing claims.
(3) Fees Related to Work Done or Damages and Making the
Claimant Whole: Prevailing claimants are generally fully
compensated. A solicitor receives her fee from the losing
party, not from the prevailing claimant's recovery. Al-
though the claimant and the solicitor's interests are not per-
fectly aligned, the English Rule minimizes lawyer windfall
profits. The fee does not increase arbitrarily with the size of
the recovery. Finally, the English Rule encourages solici-
tors to handle small cases.
16. Until recently, taxing masters had no jurisdiction over disputes that settled
before the issuance of formal papers. For many litigants, this discouraged early
agreements. The new Civil Procedure Rules provide a procedural mechanism for
parties that settle a case to have the amount of costs resolved by a taxing official.
See ENG. Civ. P.R. pt. 36 (2004) ("Offers to Settle and Payments into Court"),
available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/contents/parts/part36.
htm#rule36_13. This procedure is called a "cost only" procedure.
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The traditional standard for recoverability has traditionally been
reasonableness.1 7 More recently, pursuant to the new English Civil
Procedure Rules, proportionality has also become central to costs as-
sessments.1 8 The proportionality requirement is not, however, only a
ratio of fee to recovery. If this were the case, the English Rule would
have some of the defects of the American-style contingent fee. Solici-
tors would be reluctant to take modest cases. 1 9 In Home Office v.
17. See Home Office v. Lownds, [2002] 4 All E.R. 775, 776 (C.A.).
18. Party-to-party costs are examined in this Article. These costs refer to what a
prevailing party (receiving party) can recover from a loser (paying party). The
English Civil Procedure Rules provide:
(1) These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective
of enabling the court to deal with cases justly.
(2) Dealing with a case justly includes, so far as is practicable ....
(c) Dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate-
(i) to the amount of money involved;
(ii) to the importance of the case;
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and
(iv) to the financial position of each party ....
ENG. CIv. P.R. 1.1 (2004) ("The Overriding Objective"), available at http://www.
dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/contents/parts/part0l.htm.
Also, the assessments discussed here are standard ones. Assessments done on
an indemnity basis are more in the nature of a penalty, or, at least, more discre-
tionary with a taxing officer. Rule 44.4 provides:
(1) Where the court is to assess the amount of costs (whether by sum-
mary or detailed assessment) it will assess those costs-
(a) on the standard basis; or
(b) on the indemnity basis,
but the court will not in either case allow costs which have been un-
reasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount.
(2) Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis,
the court will-
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue;
and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were
reasonably incurred or reasonable and proportionate in amount
in favour of the paying party.
(3) Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the indemnity basis,
the court will resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether
costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount in fa-
vour of the receiving party.
ENG. CiV. P.R. 44.4 (2004) ('Basis of Assessment"), available at http://www.dca.
gov.uk/civil/procurles.Ifincontents/parts/part44.htm. See generally Charles E.
Hyde & Philip L. Williams, Necessary Costs and Expenditure Incentives Under
the English Rule, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 133, 134 (2002) (commenting on how
the English fee-shifting rule affects litigation expenditures).
19. The English Civil Procedure Rules are supplemented with Practice Directions.
The Practice Direction for Rule 44 explains:
In applying the test of proportionality the court will have regard to
Rule 1.1(2)(c). The relationship between the total of the costs incurred
and the financial value of the claim may not be a reliable guide. A fixed
percentage cannot be applied in all cases to the value of the claim in
order to ascertain whether or not the costs are proportionate.
[Vol. 83:114
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Lownds,20 Lord Woolf explained that there were often necessary costs
in even small cases. He articulated a two-part test in order to explain
the relationship of costs to damages.21 If the total costs were propor-
tionate to the damages, the particular cost items need only be reason-
able, and if the total costs were not proportionate to the damages,
particular cost items must be necessary and reasonable.2 2
Public legal aid was another important way English claimants
could fund accident litigation. In the United States, legal aid has gen-
erally been unavailable for accident victims' claims.2 3 In England,
shortly after World War II, the Government adopted an extensive le-
gal aid system that has traditionally been available for accident vic-
tims' claims. In this judicare system, qualifying claimants could
retain any lawyer willing to work for legal aid. To qualify, the claim-
ant must have met means and merit tests. Since there was no single
monetary cut-off point, as in the usual American legal aid system,
many middle income claimants, who contributed some funds to the
process, qualified for assistance. In fact, until recently much of En-
gland's personal injury litigation, especially small claims, was at least
partially funded by legal aid.
III. IMPORTANT REPORTS AND FACTORS SUPPORTING
CHANGE IN ENGLAND
As late as 1979, the Royal Commission on Legal Services confi-
dently concluded that an American-style contingent fee system was
inappropriate in England. The Report stated:
The fact that the lawyer has a direct personal interest in the outcome of the
case may lead to undesirable practices including the construction of evidence,
the improper coaching of witnesses, the use of professionally partisan expert
witnesses (especially medical witnesses), improper examination and cross-ex-
In any proceedings there will be costs which will inevitably be in-
curred and which are necessary for the successful conduct of the case.
Solicitors are not required to conduct litigation at rates which are uneco-
nomic. Thus in a modest claim the proportion of costs is likely to be
higher than in a large claim, and may even equal or possibly exceed the
amount in dispute.
ENG. Civ. P.R., COSTS PRAc. DIRECTION §§ 11.1-.2 (2004), available at http://www.
dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules-finpdf/practice-directions/pd-parts43-48.pdf
20. [2002] 4 All E.R. 775.
21. Id. at 775.
22. Id. at 782.
23. Legal assistance is left to lawyer pro bono services, or, for the poorest of people,
legal aid staff attorneys. Initiated during the Johnson presidency, and changed
dramatically during the Nixon presidency, the national Legal Services Corpora-
tion funds neighborhood legal aid offices, staffed by lawyers who assist qualified
clients. There is a single financial cut-off line. Moreover, the American legal aid
system does not assist accident injury claimants.
20041
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amination, groundless legal arguments, designed to lead the courts into error
and competitive touting.
2 4
Ten years later, Lord Chancellor Mackay shocked the legal com-
munity with a controversial Green Paper, Contingency Fees, that fo-
cused on the legal profession and made the once-heretical suggestion
that contingent fees, or some variations thereof, might be acceptable
in England.2 5 He mentioned the American-style contingent fee, but
his principal emphasis was on two other "no win, no fee" arrange-
ments. The "speculative fee" allowed the solicitor her regular fee if the
claimant prevailed, but no fee if the client lost. The "conditional fee
agreement" ("CFA") allowed the solicitor her regular fee, plus a "suc-
cess uplift," determined as a percentage of the solicitor's regular fee, if
the client prevailed. The success uplift was to be calibrated to risk
undertaken, not damages recovered. If the client lost, the solicitor re-
ceived nothing. 26 The Lord Chancellor suggested these new fee ar-
rangements would permit claimants inexpensive access to the legal
system, encourage a greater level of commitment by the solicitor, and
might encourage healthy competition among solicitors.
2 7
The time was ripe for such a suggestion. Important changes in
professional regulation, legal aid, consumer protection, and civil pro-
cedure provided an impetus for the development. There was growing
skepticism about antiquated professional regulations. Governments
of both parties rigorously examined the professional regulatory ar-
rangements for uncompetitive consequences. Since it was believed
that competition was a spur to innovation and change, all restrictive
practices, such as the ban on contingent fees, were suspect.28 Often,
over professional resistance, old Dickensian rules were challenged.
2 9
Was it necessary for Queen's Counsel to be assisted by a junior barris-
ter? Why should only barristers have the right to audience, regardless
how qualified a solicitor might be? Should all lay clients be prohibited
from directly instructing counsel? Should solicitors have a monopoly
on the conveyancing practice? 3 °
24. 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT, 1979, Cmnd. 7648, at
176-77.
25. CONTINGENCY FEES, supra note 11, para. 1.4, at 1.
26. Id. para. 5.4, at 14.
27. Id. para. 1.5, at 1-2.
28. Id. para. 3.18, at 8 ("Rules which were developed to prevent interference with the
administration of justice in feudal times may no longer be appropriate to the de-
mands of the public for the delivery of efficient and business-like legal services.").
29. See Richard Abel, The Politics of Professionalism: The Transformation of English
Lawyers at the End of the Twentieth Century, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 131, 131 (1999)
("Professional conservatism is intensified in England by the fetishism of tradi-
tion: reformers must rebut accusations of favouring 'change for change's sake.'").
30. Solicitors once had a monopoly on conveyancing and the fees it generated. Re-
cently, the government has terminated this monopoly, and, due in part to the loss
of fees, solicitors became more open to "no-win, no-pay" fees. See Herbert M.
[Vol. 83:114
THE ENGLISH COSTS WAR
There was also a growing dissatisfaction with publicly funded legal
aid. The criticism was reaching a crescendo in the early 1990s.3 1
Many believed that legal aid recipients abused the system. It was,
moreover, too expensive and there were too many frivolous suits.32
One spectacular loss, for example, involved claims concerning
benzodiazapine, in which legal aid paid out £40 million before with-
drawing support before the case came to trial.33 There were also sev-
eral highlighted cases in which undeserving wealthy persons took
advantage of the social system. 34 The Government reduced public ex-
penditures by stiffening the legal aid means test, thereby discouraging
middle income claimants from pursuing legal resolution of their
disputes.
In addition, there was a growing sensitivity to consumer protection
and a concern with informed choice. Professionals were no longer as
trusted as they once had been. Some clients needed protection from
their own solicitors and all clients needed adequate information to
make informed decisions. These concerns resulted in the adoption of
the more detailed and rigorous Solicitors' Costs Information and Cli-
ent Care Code.35 These ethics rules emphasize the importance of pro-
viding clients with the "best information possible" about the costs and
financial implications of their lawsuits.36 The primary objective of
these rules is to make certain "that clients are given the information
they need to understand what is happening generally and in particu-
lar on: (i) the cost of legal services both at the outset and as a matter
progresses; and (ii) responsibility for clients' matters."3 7
Finally, there were substantial critiques of the entire civil justice
system. Lord Woolf, in his impressive 1996 report, Access to Justice ,38
asked whether the system was providing adequate access to justice
and the legal system. The answer was no-it was too expensive. He
recommended changes-many of which were implemented in the Civil
Procedure Act of 1997, the Access to Justice Act of 1999, and amend-
Kritzer, The Fracturing Legal Profession: The Case of Plaintiffs' Personal Injury
Lawyers, 8 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 225, 242 (2001).
31. Abel, supra note 3, at 268.
32. See id. at 253.
33. Kritzer, supra note 30, at 234.
34. See, e.g., Nicholas Rufford, US-Style Legal Fee Scheme to Expand, LONDON SUN.
TIMES, July 20, 1997, at 24 (reporting that a retired couple used legal aid to fight
a case with their neighbors over a wall that fell down at their home; the cost was
£2,980,000.).
35. GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS § 13.02 (8th ed. 1999),
available at http'//www.guide-on-line.lawsociety.org.uk.
36. Id. § 13.02(4)(c).
37. Id. § 13.02(1)(b).
38. LORD WOOLF, DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE-FINAL RE-




ments to the Civil Procedure Rules-designed to reduce costs gener-
ally, and, more specifically, to make costs predictable and
proportionate to the nature of the dispute. 39 Some of the most impor-
tant recommendations to reduce costs were a tiered judicial system,
with different operating rules for different levels, and more active ju-
dicial management. Of particular relevance to this Article, Lord
Woolf's report called for the development of protocols to encourage set-
39. Lord Woolf, in Access to Justice, emphasized the importance of costs considera-
tions. The following is quoted from Chapter 7:
The importance of costs
1. I began the chapter on costs in the interim report by saying: "The
problem of costs is the most serious problem besetting our litigation
system."
2. The year which has elapsed since the interim report has not caused
me to alter that assessment. Costs are a significant problem because:
(a) litigation is so expensive that the majority of the public cannot
afford it unless they receive financial assistance;
(b) the costs incurred in the course of litigation are out of proportion
to the issues involved; and
(c) the costs are uncertain in amount so that the parties have diffi-
culty in predicting what their ultimate liability might be if the ac-
tion is lost.
3. The adverse consequences which flow from the problems in relation to
costs contaminate the whole civil justice system. Fear of costs deters
some litigants from litigating when they would otherwise be entitled
to do so and compels other litigants to settle their claims when they
have no wish to do so. It enables the more powerful litigant to take
unfair advantage of the weaker litigant. The scale of costs per case
has an adverse effect on the scope of the legal aid system. It also ad-
versely affects the reputation of our civil justice system abroad and
may be making this country less attractive for overseas investment
and as a forum for the settlement of commercial disputes. As I
pointed out in the interim report, it is incorrect to assume that high
costs are not a problem merely because they are met out of a rela-
tively deep pocket or are passed on in insignificant amounts to indi-
vidual consumers. They still constitute an unnecessary cost to the
economy as a whole and are not acceptable however they are
distributed.
5. Costs are central to the changes I wish to bring about. Virtually all
my recommendations are designed at least in part to tackle the
problems of costs. They are intended to:
(a) reduce the scale of costs by controlling what is required of the par-
ties in the conduct of proceedings;
(b) make the amount of costs more predictable;
(c) make costs more proportionate to the nature of the dispute;
(d) make the courts' powers to make orders as to costs a more effec-
tive incentive for responsible behaviour and a more compelling de-
terrent against unreasonable behaviour;
(e) provide litigants with more information as to costs so that they
can exercise greater control of the expenses which are incurred by
their lawyers on their behalf.
WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 38, at ch. 7, available at http://www.dca.
gov.uk/civil/final/sec2c.htm#c7.
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tlements before formal proceedings were issued.40 It also recom-
mended a procedure to resolve questions of costs without requiring
litigants to initiate a formal lawsuit.4 1 The Government adopted all
these recommendations. Thus, a skepticism about practice traditions,
a reduction in the public legal aid commitment, a sensitivity to client
concerns, and an emphasis on an efficient and affordable legal system
informed the funding changes.
IV. THE FIRST REVISED LITIGATION FUNDING SYSTEM
The Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 revised the then-ex-
isting funding system by legitimating (pursuant to implementing reg-
ulations) conditional fee agreements ("CFAs") for certain cases in
specified circumstances. 42 Although there was strident opposition to
40. See id. at ch. 10, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec3a.htm#cl0.
These recommendations were later implemented. See ENG. Civ. P.R., PRE-Ac-
TION PROTOCOL FOR PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS §§ 1.1-.2 (2004), available at http://
www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules -fin/contents/protocols/protpic.htm.
41. See WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 38. Prior to implementation of Lord
Woolfs reforms in the Access to Justice Act of 1999, an order for costs could only
be made in the action in which substantive relief was claimed. See Callery v.
Gray, [2001] 3 All E.R. 833, 845 (C.A.). To remedy this procedural impediment to
early settlement, the Civil Procedure Rules were amended to permit cost taxation
in an independent procedure. This became known as a "cost only" or "Section 8"
procedure. See supra note 16. Civil Procedure Rule 44.12A states:
(1) This rule sets out a procedure which may be followed where-
(a) the parties to a dispute have reached an agreement on all issues
(including which party is to pay the costs) which is made or con-
firmed in writing; but
(b) they have failed to agree the amount of those costs; and
(c) no proceedings have been started.
(2) Either party to the agreement may start proceedings under this rule
by issuing a claim form in accordance with Part 8.
ENG. Civ. P.R. 44.12A (2004) ("General Rules About Costs: Costs-Only Proceed-
ings"), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/contents/parts/
part44.htm#rule44_l2A.
42. The Courts and Legal Services Act provides in relevant part:
(1) In this section "a conditional fee agreement" means an agreement in
writing between a person providing advocacy or litigation services
and his client which ....
(b) provides for that person's fees and expenses, or any part of them,
to be payable only in specified circumstances;
(c) complies with such requirements (if any) as may be prescribed by
the Lord Chancellor ....
(2) Where a conditional fee agreement provides for the amount of any
fees to which it applies to be increased, in specified circumstances,
above the amount which would be payable if it were not a conditional
fee agreement, it shall specify the percentage by which that amount
is to be increased. ...
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any form of contingent fee system from a number of interest groups, 43
within one year the Government announced its willingness to imple-
ment CFAs, whereby a solicitor for a prevailing claimant might enter
into a "no win, no fee" contract with a success uplift based on a per-
centage of the solicitor's regular fee.44 The government rejected the
American-style contingent fee as having too many "undesirable side
effects," not the least of which were that there was no correlation be-
tween recovery and risk and that solicitors would be discouraged from
taking small cases.4 5 Still, one commentator believed that there had
(3) Subject to subsection (6), a conditional fee agreement which relates
to specified proceedings shall not be unenforceable by reason only of
its being a conditional fee agreement.
(8) Where a party to any proceedings has entered into a conditional fee
agreement and a costs order is made in those proceedings in his fa-
vour, the costs payable to him shall not include any element which
takes account of any percentage increase payable under the
agreement.
Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 58 (Eng.).
43. One particular fear was that the introduction of conditional fees would be the
first step to the total elimination of legal aid. Others believed that the new ar-
rangements would encourage a "compensation culture." In retrospect, both pre-
dictions seem appropriate. See Abel, supra note 3, at 257-59 (discussing the
intensity of the debate).
The title of the Abel's article, An American Hamburger Stand in St. Paul's
Cathedral: Replacing Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury
Litigation, comes from his quoting of an American expatriate who was opposed to
the introduction of the American-style contingent fee in the English system. See
id.
44. See LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, LEGAL SERVICES: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
FUTURE, 1989, Cm. 740.
45. The Lord Chancellor's Department commented:
The Green Paper [on contingency fees] stimulated lively debate on the
acceptability in principle of any contingency fee arrangement, and on the
differences between those jurisdictions where it is permitted in some
form or other and the legal and commercial arrangements in England
and Wales. There was a clear consensus that it would not be right in
principle, and would be likely to have a number of undesirable side-ef-
fects, for a lawyer to be permitted to undertake a case in return for some
percentage of whatever damages might be received. That form of contin-
gency fee was also thought likely to create an unacceptable degree of
conflict of interest between the lawyer and his client, which could result
in his being unable to give the client or the court advice of the required
degree of impartiality. There was, however, little objection to the propo-
sal that arrangements following the model of the Scottish speculative
action (payment of normal fees only if successful) should be allowed in
England and Wales, and some support for the proposition that the client
and his lawyers should be able to agree an uplift to those costs when
acting on this basis. There was, moreover, a very clear consensus that
the general rule that costs follow the event should not be changed.
Id. para. 14.2, at 41.
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been a titanic shift in the foundation of the legal profession.46 Law-
yers now had a financial stake in the outcome.4 7
The Bar's abandonment of its "cab-rank rule" in light of this dra-
matic change illustrates the impact. The cab-rank rule is one of the
Bar's most fundamental professional principles. It requires that a
competent barrister be available to all clients.48 A barrister cannot
pick and choose among clients who are able to pay her fee.
"No win, no fee" agreements, however, put the barrister at finan-
cial risk. Even if she should prosper in the long run, there may be
difficult times. Solicitors, through partnership arrangements, can
share these risks. Barristers, on the other hand, must be independent
professionals; they cannot join in a risk- and profit-sharing business
arrangement. 49 Recognizing the tension between availability to all
46. See Richard L. Abel, The Professional as Political: English Lawyers from the 1989
Green Papers Through the Access to Justice Act 1999 (available in the Schmid
Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law) (giving a full account
of the dispute) ("[Tihe Government's most radical reform was transferring the
cost of litigation from the state to the parties.").
Many opposed changes in the legal aid system. One commentator called the
recommended changes Orwellian, and claimed that the English legal aid system
was the "most efficient of all public services," and that it was regrettable that it
would be replaced by "the despised stock in trade of the ambulance chasers of
America." Abel, supra note 3, at 297. See also Colleen P. Graffy, Conditional
Fees: Key to the Courthouse or the Casino?, 1 LEGAL ETHIcs 70, 80 (1998).
47. Graffy, supra note 46, at 70.
48. The Code of Conduct for barristers provides:
A barrister in independent practice must comply with the 'Cab-rank
rule' and accordingly except only as otherwise provided in paragraphs
603 604 605 and 606 he must in any field in which he professes to prac-
tise in relation to work appropriate to his experience and seniority and
irrespective of whether his client is paying privately or is publicly
funded:
(a) accept any brief to appear before a Court in which he professes to
practise;
(b) accept any instructions;
(c) act for any person on whose behalf he is instructed;
and do so irrespective of (i) the party on whose behalf he is instructed (ii)
the nature of the case and (iii) any belief or opinion which he may have
formed as to the character reputation cause conduct guilt or innocence of
that person.
CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES § 602 (7th ed. 2000),
available at http:/www.barcouncil.org.ukldocument.asp?languageid=1&docu-
mentid=86.
49. One commentator noted:
In this respect, as generally, the Bar's prohibition against barristers in
England and Wales entering into partnerships can indeed be regarded
as the means by which the Bar 'deprives itself of the advantages of the
most helpful form of organisation between working [people]'. Further-
more, there seems to be little ethical justification for the rule which, as
Abel has observed, is one of the Bar's 'restrictive practices limiting inter-
nal competition' between juniors. It is however ostensibly justified by
the need to ensure continued application of the cab-rank principle and to
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and taking a financial risk (i.e., in effect becoming an insurer), the Bar
Council jettisoned its fundamental cab-rank rule and it now permits a
barrister to refuse a CFA client for this reason alone. 50
There was no immediate rush to use CFAs, and the Lord Chancel-
lor took five years to promulgate the implementing regulations,
known as "Regulations of 1995."51 The Regulations of 1995 applied to
a limited class of cases, primarily personal injury suits. CFAs that
complied with the regulations were enforceable. The Regulations of
1995 set a one hundred percent maximum success uplift. Since there
was no experience and no consensus as to what figure would be suita-
ble, the Lord Chancellor apparently chose an uplift sufficient to en-
courage solicitors to represent claimants with an even chance of
success.
52
The Regulations of 1995 were uncomplicated. Section 3 focused on
the required content of the CFA, such as that the CFA had to state
"whether or not the amount payable is limited by reference to the
avoid conflicts of interest that might reduce access to barrister's services.
It is based on the view that competition is best served by maintaining
the Bar as a pool of sole practitioners who 'compete vigorously on equal
terms.'
Peter Kunzlik, Conditional Fees: The Ethical and Organisational Impact on the
Bar, 62 MOD. L. REV. 850, 873 (1999).
50. See generally id. at 860-63. Under the Code of Conduct, a "barrister in indepen-
dent practice is not obliged to accept instructions . . . to do any work under a
conditional fee agreement." CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND
WALES § 604 (7th ed. 2000), available at http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/document.
asp?languageid=1&documentid=86.
51. Conditional Fee Agreements Order, (1995) SI 1995/1674, available at http://www.
legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/sil995/Uksi_19951674_en-l.htm; Conditional Fee
Agreements Regulations, (1995) SI 1995/1675, available at http://www.legisla-
tion.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1995/Uksi_19951675 en_1.htm.
52. The Law Society developed a model conditional fee agreement that provided that
no success fee should be greater than maximum of twenty-five percent of the re-
covered damages. Barristers accepted this figure, and, if counsel worked on a
CFA, the combined recovery of solicitor and barrister should not exceed this
twenty-five-percent maximum. Graham Robinson, The CFA is Here to Stay-A
Litigator's Guide to Conditional Fee Agreements and Other Funding Arrange-
ments, 2001 J. PERS. INJ. L. 1, 44-51.
Not surprisingly, many solicitors used this twenty-five-percent figure as a
matter of course. One commentator has suggested that in practice this was an
indirect American-style contingency fee. Zander, supra note 13, at 267.
It is generally accepted that if the chances of success are no better than
50 per cent the success fee should be 100 per cent. The thinking behind
this is that if a solicitor were to take two identical cases with a 50 per
cent chance of success in each it is likely that one would be lost and the
other won. Accordingly the success fee (of 100 per cent) in the winning
case would enable the solicitor to bear the loss of running the other case
and losing.
Gordon Wignall, Conditional Fees Update, 153 NEW L.J. 676, 677 (2003).
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amount of any damages recovered on behalf of the client."53 Section 4
emphasized appropriate client care and communication with the cli-
ent. The CFA had to state that immediately before it was entered
into, the legal representative had "[drawn] the client's attention to
matters" relating to legal fees and costs. 54
The implementation of this first revised litigation funding system,
and its extension in 1998 to a broader range of cases, did not, however,
slow the debates regarding deregulation, legal aid, consumer protec-
tion, and civil procedure. In the next few years, the Government pub-
lished several important papers and reports relevant to the costs
issues. As referred to supra, Lord Woolfs 1996 report, Access to Jus-
tice,55 was enormously influential. In the same year, the Lord Chan-
cellor issued his white paper, Striking the Balance-The Future of
53. Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, (1995) SI 1995/1675 § 3, available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/sil995/Uksi-19951675_en_1.htm. Section
3 provides:
An agreement shall state-
(a) the particular proceedings or parts of them to which it relates (in-
cluding whether it relates to any counterclaim, appeal or proceedings
to enforce a judgment or order);
(b) the circumstances in which the legal representative's fees and ex-
penses or part of them are payable;
(c) what, if any, payment is due-
(i) upon partial failure of the specified circumstances to occur;
(ii) irrespective of the specified circumstances occurring; and
(iii) upon termination of the agreement for any reason;
(d) the amount payable in accordance with sub-paragraphs (b) or (c)
above or the method to be used to calculate the amount payable; and
in particular whether or not the amount payable is limited by refer-
ence to the amount of any damages which may be recovered on be-
half of the client.
Id. § 3.
54. Id. § 4. Section 4 provides:
(1) The agreement shall also state that, immediately before it was en-
tered into, the legal representative drew the client's attention to the
matters specified in paragraph (2).
(2) The matters are-
(a) whether the client might be entitled to legal aid in respect of the
proceedings to which the agreement relates, the conditions upon
which legal aid is available and the application of those condi-
tions to the client in respect of the proceedings;
(b) the circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay the
fees and expenses of the legal representative in accordance with
the agreement;
(c) the circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay the
costs of any other party to the proceedings; and
(d) the circumstances in which the client may seek taxation of the
fees and expenses of the legal representative and the procedure
for so doing.
Id.
55. See WOOLF, AccESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 38.
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Legal Aid in England and Wales.56 In 1997, Sir Middleton published
his Review of Civil Justice and Legal Aid. 57 This last report reflected
a growing governmental consensus that CFAs could virtually displace
legal aid. More controversially, Sir Middleton suggested that it was
time for England to seriously consider the American-style contingent
fee.5 8 The English Rule and the fact that juries do not usually set
damages would ameliorate American-style abuses. Sir Middleton
reported:
I also think that the time is now ripe to reconsider whether contingency fees-
where the fee is a proportion of the amount recovered rather than an uplift to
the normal bill-should also be permitted. There is no essential difference in
principle between conditional and contingency fees. Indeed, in some ways the
latter may be preferable. Contingency fees create an incentive to achieve the
best possible result for the client, not just a simple win. And they reward a
cost-effective approach in a way that conditional fees, where the lawyers' re-
muneration is still based on an hourly bill, do not. Opponents of contingency
fees usually cite the experience of them in the United States of America. How-
ever, considering the differences between the two jurisdictions-notably the
cost-shifting rule and the fact that juries here do not generally set damages-
we should re-assess whether those concerns may be misplaced.5 9
V. AFTER-THE-EVENT INSURANCE AND THE SECOND
REVISED LITIGATION FUNDING SYSTEM
In spite of these dramatic changes in legal aid and litigation fund-
ing, the new system did not instantaneously assure access to justice
for all legitimate claimants. There remained two significant problems
for risk-averse parties. First, pursuant to the English Rule, a losing
claimant might be liable for the prevailing party's solicitor's fees and
litigation costs. Second, since the success uplift was not recoverable,
the claimant was responsible for it, and, therefore, even a prevailing
claimant would not recover all his damages.
To remedy the first problem, the Law Society, with several insur-
ance companies, developed a new after-the-event ("ATE") insurance
policy. This type of policy covered risks associated with losing a law-
suit. The early policies indemnified the loser for the prevailing party's
56. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, STRIKING THE BALANCE-THE FUTURE OF LE-
GAL AID IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1996, Cm. 3305. See also Press Release, Lord
Chancellor's Department, Striking the Balance: The Future of Legal Aid in En-
gland and Wales (July 2, 1996), at http://www.newsrelease-archive.net/coi/depts/
GLC/coi0084c.ok.
57. SIR PETER MIDDLETON, DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR (1997) (reviewing civil justice and legal aid), available at http:l
www.dca.gov.uk/middle/index.htm. Some have argued that Sir Middleton was
insufficiently sensitive to the need for legal aid. See, e.g., Graffy, supra note 46,
at 84-85.
58. See MIDDLETON, supra note 57, § 5.50.
59. Id. § 5.50.
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solicitor's fees and litigation costs. The policies soon expanded to
cover the litigant's own nonrecoverable costs. 60
The insurance companies primarily sold ATE insurance through
solicitors, who acted as their agents. This was efficient in that the
solicitor who assessed litigation risk to determine her own success up-
lift could also apply the analysis to an insurance premium. The devel-
opment and marketing of ATE insurance, however, was difficult.
Insurers first underestimated their liabilities, and the early premium
revenues were insufficient to cover the costs. In part this was due to
cherry picking. If a claimant had a solid claim, there was little need
for ATE insurance; thus, solicitors tended to recommend ATE policies
only to claimants with weak cases. Moreover, solicitors would often
delay recommending a policy until they determined how strong the
case was. Not infrequently, this did not occur until after the case
failed to settle during the mandatory settlement procedures. As a re-
sult, the premium-paying pool only included claimants with weak or
contested cases. This led to high premiums. In order to spread the
risk among more claimants, thereby reducing insurance premiums,
ATE insurers soon required their agent-solicitors to recommend the
insurance to all accident claimants at their first meeting.
Although ATE insurance addressed the first problem, it aggra-
vated the second. Since neither the ATE premium nor the success up-
lift were recoverable by the prevailing party, it was possible that a
prevailing claimant would pay a substantial percentage of recovered
damages for fees and the insurance premium. Popular investigative
reporters publicized cases in which claimants lost substantial portions
of their recovered damages to fees, costs, and premiums.
The Access to Justice Act of 199961 offered a dramatic solution to
these two problems. This is the second revision of the funding system.
These changes, as will be discussed, also generated what some have
called "guerrilla warfare" in satellite cost litigation. 62 The Act applied
the English Rule to success uplifts and ATE premiums.6 3 The prevail-
60. After 2000 and the second revised litigation funding system, insurance compa-
nies not only were willing to defer payment of the premium to the end of the
lawsuit, but they also agreed not to charge any premium above a recoverable
amount. Zander, supra note 13, at 267-69.
61. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22 (Eng.).
62. See infra section VI.B.
63. Section 27 of the Access to Justice Act amended Section 58A of the Courts and
Legal Services Act to, inter alia, provide: "A costs order made in any proceedings
may, subject in the case of court proceedings to rules of court, include provision
requiring the payment of any fees payable under a conditional fee agreement
which provides for a success fee." Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 27 (Eng.).
The Access to Justice Act also added a new section to the Courts and Legal Ser-
vices Act to, inter alia, provide:
Where in any proceedings a costs order is made in favour of any party
who has taken out an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a
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ing party would be able to recover both of these, and, therefore, he
would now be fully compensated. 6 4 Risk-averse claimants no longer
had to fear litigation. If they prevailed, they recovered all fees and the
insurance premium. If they lost, they paid no fees, the insurance com-
pany paid the prevailing party's costs, and, although they might have
been liable for the insurance premiums, creative financing and insur-
ance coverage soon made it apparent that claimants would not even be
responsible for the premium.6 5
The Lord Chancellor's Department promulgated the CFA Regula-
tions of 2000 to implement the second revised litigation funding sys-
tem in April 2000.66 The Regulations were exceedingly complicated
and detailed because they compromised among a number of important
concerns and interests. They offered an alternative to legal aid; reas-
sured risk-averse claimants; guaranteed that a prevailing claimant
would keep all the recovered damages; regulated conflicts of interest;
mandated professional communication and careful client care; en-
couraged early settlement; and, finally, assured paying parties that
they would have a mechanism for challenging excessive fees, success
uplifts, and insurance premiums.
Section 2 delineated the required content of an enforceable CFA
agreement. Section 3 was added to the earlier Regulations. Since suc-
cess fees were now recoverable, it was necessary for the solicitor to set
out "the reasons for setting the percentage increase at the level stated
in the agreement."6 7 This would assure, among other goals, that if
liability in those proceedings, the costs payable to him may, subject in
the case of court proceedings to rules of court, include costs in respect of
the premium of the policy.
Id. § 29.
64. The Lord Chancellor's Department commented:
Under the changes that are being made the uplift in fees and insurance
costs will be recoverable. This will not only mean that someone claiming
money will keep more of any damages that are recovered, but also that it
will be easier to bring a case which does not involve a claim for money
and it will make conditional fee agreements and after the event insur-
ance suitable for defendants.
DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER: CONDITIONAL FEES:
SHARING THE RISKS OF LITIGATION: THE GOvERNMENT'S CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING
CONSULTATION ON THE ABOvE PAPER para. 9 (2000), at http://www.dca.gov.uk/con-
sult/confees/confeesfr.htm [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER].
65. After 2000, insurance companies not only were willing to defer payment of the
premium to the end of the lawsuit, but they also agreed not to charge any pre-
mium above a recoverable amount. Zander, supra note 13, at 267-69.
66. Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, (2000) SI 2000/692.
67. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 64, para. 26. The Lord Chancellor's Depart-
ment explained:
When the terms of the conditional fee agreement are agreed the legal
representative should produce written reasons for his or her client set-
ting out the level of uplift charged. This requirement would provide the
client with contemporary information on the factors which informed the
[Vol. 83:114
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there should be a challenge to the reasonableness of the fee, there
would be a contemporaneous explanation for the rate. Section 4 was
an elaborate client-care, informed-consent regulation. It required that
the "legal representative" shall inform the client of an array of mat-
ters, such as whether there is insurance, whether other methods of
financing are available, whether the legal representative thinks any
particular method of financing is appropriate. The legal representa-
tive had to communicate all these matters orally, and some of the mat-
ters had to be communicated both orally and in writing.6 8 Many
believed that these client-care regulations were better left to profes-
sional codes. Moreover, it was ironic that such detail was provided
when the claimant had less reason to need it. After all, if the claimant
lost, he did not pay, and if he won, he could recover the fees, expenses,
and premium.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND REVISED
LITIGATION FUNDING SYSTEM
Since claimants in routine traffic cases almost always recovered
some damages (usually in a settlement), they were normally the pre-
vailing party. As such, where once they had relied on themselves and
legal aid for funding, they were effectively able to shift the funding of
litigation, including conditional fees, success uplifts, and after-the-
event ("ATE") insurance premiums, to defendant liability insurance
companies. There were at least two important consequences. First,
this dramatic shift resulted in a flourishing claims management busi-
ness. Frequently called "claims farmers," these lay and unregulated
firms fostered claims and soon commanded a large percentage of
claimants' business, such as routine traffic accident cases.6 9 Some-
times they worked with solicitors; at other times they were in competi-
tion. Second, defendant liability insurance companies resisted the
solicitor's decision to set the level of the success fee, and would provide
the court with information upon which to decide whether that part of the
success fee that is to be recoverable is fair and reasonable if it is chal-
lenged on final assessment. It would not only reduce the negative effect
of hindsight on the final assessment. Preparing a written risk assess-
ment which not only specifies what part of the success fee relates to the
solicitor's risk in costs, but which also reflects the position when the con-
ditional fee agreement was entered into would assist the court in decid-
ing whether the level set was appropriate given the facts at that time
. . . and would also go some way towards satisfying client care
requirements.
Id.
68. See id. para. 9.
69. Generally speaking, there were two types of firms. Claims assessors were busi-
nesses that agreed to negotiate on behalf of claimants, and claims management
companies were businesses that coordinated all relevant personnel. Both were
and remain unregulated.
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shifting of litigation funding and the ambulance-chasing techniques of
claims management firms, aggressively challenging the recoverability
of all costs. At the least, this "guerrilla warfare" over recoverable
costs has generated much wasteful and expensive satellite and test
litigation that, among other things, delayed payments and reduced
the necessary cash flow to claimants' representatives.
A. Claims Management Firms
In England, lawyers do not have a monopoly, as they do in many
American states, on the management of legal claims. Since there is no
broad ban on the unauthorized practice of law (with the exception of
courtroom practice), nonprofessional firms compete directly with solic-
itors for claimants. 7 0 On the one hand, this encourages some meritori-
ous victims to initiate legal actions. Claims management firms are
user-friendly. They manage the processes, the professionals, and the
legal system in ways that are convenient for claimants with little ex-
perience with the legal system. On the other hand, claims manage-
ment firms might easily corrupt the processes by initiating
nonmeritorious suits, stirring up unwarranted litigation, and, in some
cases, exploiting their own clients. During the first two years of the
second revised litigation funding scheme, two controversial compa-
nies, Claims Direct and The Accident Group ("TAG"), dominated the
field.71 They attracted claimants with extensive televison commer-
cials and they aggressively solicited claimants with direct personal
contact, often in railroad stations or shopping malls. It was some-
times difficult for a person to walk down the street without being
70. See generally BRIAN BLACKWELL, THE REPORT OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S COM-
MIIrEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ACTIVTIES OF NON-LEGALLY QUALIFIED CLAIMS ASSES-
SORS AND EMPLOYMENT ADVISERS (2000), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/
blackwell/reportfr.htm (investigating and establishing facts about services pro-
vided by claims assessors and making recommendations to the Lord Chancellor).
Blackwell commented:
The Access to Justice Act 1999 has introduced new provisions that will
allow recovery from the losing party in a claim the success fee and the
premium in addition to damages and solicitor's costs. Some commenta-
tors have suggested that this will cause a withering away of claims as-
sessors business. The reason is that claims assessors operating on a
contingency fee basis will be uncompetitive faced with solicitors all of
whose costs will be recoverable from the loser. We take the view that
consumers who receive appropriate information may well consider that
solicitors are a better bargain but this is not inevitable. To some extent
the person who makes the first contact with the client is likely to pick up
the business. Also, some clients might find claims assessors more user
friendly to deal with than solicitors or barristers.
Id. para. 104 (citation omitted).
71. Claims Direct netted its founders, former taxi driver Tony Sulman and solicitor
Colin Poole close to £60,000,000 in a stock offering. Law: An Accident Waiting to
Happen, THE INDEPENDENT, June 10, 2003.
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asked if he had recently been injured. Critical investigative reporting
exposed abuses, such as unwarranted and fraudulent claims, exces-
sive fees, and inattention to certain cases. Both companies have had
serious legal and financial problems, and both declared bankruptcy.72
As to operating procedures, different firms used similar ap-
proaches. After contacting the claimant and investigating his claim to
ascertain that it had a better-than-even chance of success, a firm em-
ployee, or perhaps a franchised case management agent, would then
meet with the claimant, often at the claimant's home, and assist the
claimant with scheduling and paperwork.73 If necessary, the agent
72. As of June 2004, five large claims management firms had declared bankruptcy.
"Ethical" Option Invaro is Latest Claims Firm to Go to the Wall, LEGAL WEEK,
June 24, 2004.
73. There are a number of companies engaged in representing claimants. See
BLACKWELL, supra note 70. The Blackwell report describes some of the differ-
ences between different sorts of companies:
Overwhelmingly, personal injury claims are either withdrawn or result
in settlement without the issue of court proceedings. However, whilst
solicitors can issue court proceedings, claims assessors are limited to ob-
taining instructions from clients to negotiate settlements of claims for
personal injury or death. As they cannot issue a case in court this poses
the central conundrum of their work: does their inability to threaten pro-
ceedings mean that defendants are more likely to make low settlement
offers and, in turn, do they have a financial incentive to accept such of-
fers? The Committee has no evidence on which to base such a conclu-
sion, although it does not necessarily follow that this is not the case for
the reasons set out above.
Claims assessors earn their income by charging the clients for whom
they act. Whilst solicitors operate in the same way in most cases of per-
sonal injury, insurance companies who settle claims pay damages and
solicitor's costs. The solicitor may then make a further charge to the
client but often the solicitor will be content with what is recovered from
the defendant. Conversely, the charging system adopted by claims as-
sessors is usually "no win no fee" and on a contingency basis. This
means that the claims assessor takes a percentage of the damages recov-
ered and nothing if the negotiation is unsuccessful. That percentage is
not regulated although it may be subject to an element of protection
under normal consumer law. However, such protection will be of little
value as the settlement cheque will be paid to the assessor who will then
deduct the costs. This leaves the only recourse open to a dissatisfied
client as being to sue the assessor which is unlikely to happen.
In the course of the Committee's work we became aware of the in-
creasing importance in the field of personal injury claims of claims man-
agement companies. Whilst claims management companies may in
detail operate in different ways, their fundamental purpose and struc-
ture is to develop arrangements with a wide range of the service provid-
ers who are usually involved in personal injury cases in particular
solicitors but sometimes also barristers, litigation insurers and funders,
medical experts and others. One at least also has arrangements with
claims managers who visit clients or potential clients in their homes and
liaise between the client and the other providers. If an individual be-
lieves that he or she may have a case they can contact the claims man-
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would explain CFAs and ATE insurance. 74 The management firm
then orchestrated the lawsuit and the professionals, including solici-
tors, insisting that all professional participants comply with its care-
fully drafted operations manual. This was to assure efficiency and
quality control. The management firm directed the claimant to a
panel solicitor (who would take the case with a conditional fee agree-
ment, with or without a success uplift), experts (including doctors),
and counsel (sometimes requiring consultation).7 5 Additionally, the
management firm or a close affiliate not infrequently offered litigation
support services, such as investigating witnesses and taking their
statements. In some cases, the management firm required that its
panel solicitors pay for these support services. In the Claims Direct
plan, for example, the solicitor paid £395 for each case. Later, defen-
dant liability insurance companies challenged the bona fides of this
payment. 76
Before 2000, the financial plans of claims management firms were
not unduly complex. Claims Direct, for example, in addition to selling
franchises to claims agents, used a model similar to a litigation fund-
ing firm in the United States-it charged a successful claimant a per-
centage (i.e., thirty percent) of recovered damages.7 7 If the claimant
agement company and, if their case goes ahead, benefit from the package
of arrangements. It is not unusual for a person buying into such an ar-
rangement not to be asked for money up front and to be assured that
they will not have to pay anything unless the case is successful.
Id. paras. 77, 79, 81 (internal citations omitted).
74. Comp. Specialists Ltd. v. Comp. Claims Serv. Ltd., [2003] EWCA Civ 1108 (C.A.),
illustrates the complexity of these relationships. The Court of Appeal had to re-
solve a dispute between a claims management firm and its franchisee, who
wanted to terminate the relationship. The Court held, that, at a minimum the
contractual understanding must have intended the franchisee to continue to pro-
vide important client care for the duration of the lawsuit.
75. Panel solicitors could recover their fees from the other side if the claimant pre-
vailed. They would also seek expert and counsel fees as costs.
76. See infra Part VII.
77. Although there remains some doubt, it is likely that this form of contract between
a claims management firm and a claimant will not be champertous, and, there-
fore, it is enforceable.
In Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and
the Regions (No. 2), [2002] 2 All E.R. 97 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal noted that the
new CFA regulations pointed the way to a growing tolerance to what were once-
champertous agreements, at least with respect to persons who did not practice
law before courts. The new system provided a "powerful indication" of the public
policy in favor of holding champertous agreements generally enforceable and con-
cluded that, on the facts of the case an expert accountant's contingent fee was
enforceable and recoverable. Id.
In Pirie v. Ayling, 2003 WL 21353355, para. 9 (Sup. Ct. Cost Office Jan. 30,
2003 & Feb. 18, 2003), Chief Master Hurst decided that an ATE insurance pre-
mium equal to twenty percent of the damages was not champertous. The Master
concluded that champerty "survives as a rule of public policy capable of rending a
contract unenforceable."
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prevailed, the solicitor sought to recover fees, costs, and disburse-
ments, even including the solicitor's required payment for litigation
services. If the claimant lost, the solicitor received nothing, and the
management firm covered the claimant's own costs as well as the pre-
vailing party's costs.
With the inauguration of the second revised litigation system, the
financial arrangements became more complex and obscure. In effect,
some firms sought to profit by inflating recoverable costs, such as suc-
cess fees and insurance premiums, at the expense of defendant liabil-
ity insurance companies. Claims Direct, for example, nominally
served as an agent to sell ATE insurance policies for a risk under-
writer. After the management firm arranged for a bank to advance
the premium, the risk underwriter reallocated the premium in a com-
plex and obscure way, so that, at the end of the day, the management
firm received a substantial part of the total premium. The insurance
underwriter, for example, contracted for insurance management ser-
vices from the claims management firm or an affiliate. As will be dis-
cussed infra,78 defendant liability insurance companies challenged the
bona fides of these premiums, claiming that it was an insurance pre-
mium in name only.
The claimant had the best of all worlds. If he prevailed in his law-
suit, he recovered his entire damages and the professionals recovered
their CFA fees, uplifts, respective costs, and the insurance premium.
[But, in this case, there was no] danger ... that the insurer might be
tempted for his own personal gain to inflame the damages, to suppress
evidence or even to suborn witnesses. Furthermore .... the company
makes its profits from the insurance not from the litigation, it does not
divide the spoils but relies upon the fruits of the litigation as a source
from which the insured can satisfy her liability for the premium in re-
turn for the provision of a genuine service, namely the ATE insurance
cover which is external to the litigation.
Id.
Also, consistent with this expansive approach, the Court of Appeal, in Gulf
Azov Shipping v. Idisi, [2004] EWCA Civ 292, [20041 All E.R. (D) 284, recently
held that a third party litigation funding company would not be responsible for
costs in the event that the funded party lost the lawsuit. The Court believed that
this was necessary to assure that all persons had access to justice. Lord Phillips
wrote:
Public policy now recognizes that it is desirable, in order to facilitate
access to justice, that third parties should provide assistance designed to
ensure that those who are involved in litigation have the benefit of legal
representation. Intervention to this end will not normally render the
intervener liable to pay costs. If the intervener has agreed, or antici-
pates, some reward for his intervention, this will not necessarily expose
him to liability for costs. Whether it does will depend upon what is just,
having regard to the facts of the individual case. If the intervention is in
bad faith, or for some ulterior motive, then the intervener will be at risk
in relation to costs occasioned as a consequence of his intervention.
Id. para. 54.
78. See infra subsection VI.B.2.
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If the claimant lost, there was no fee pursuant to the CFA agreement,
and the ATE insurance covered the prevailing party's costs, the claim-
ant's costs, and, in many cases, the ATE insurance premium.
B. The Satellite Litigation
Defendant insurance companies found this new scheme intolera-
ble. Particularly aggravating was their perception that since claim-
ants risked nothing, they had no incentive to monitor the fees, the
uplifts, or the premiums, and therefore the sky was the limit. There
was no initial check on the amounts. In what some have called a
"guerrilla war," the defendant insurance companies took every oppor-
tunity to challenge elements of the second revised litigation funding
system between 2000 and 2003. In the aggregate, there were large
amounts at stake, and even if a defendant liability insurance company
should lose a case, the delay in payment was important. Expensive
and time-consuming satellite litigation became the norm in many
courts. Several important courts-the Court of Appeal, the House of
Lords, and the Supreme Court Taxing Office (in a series of compli-
cated test cases), among others-addressed related issues raised by
the second litigation funding system. The litigation fell roughly into
three categories: (1) an analysis of fundamental principles and reason-
ableness; (2) a deconstruction of the recoverable ATE insurance pre-
mium; and (3) a series of technical challenges premised on the
incompatibility of the second revised litigation funding system and the
indemnity principle. It was not until the summer of 2003, three years
after the second revised litigation funding scheme was initiated, that
there came a moment of repose.
1. Fundamental Principles and Reasonableness
a. The First English Cases
The Callery v. Gray cases (Callery (No. 1)79 and Callery (No. 2)80
in the Court of Appeal and the combined appeals in the House of
Lords8 1 ) were the first leading cases. They involved, as did most of
the early litigation, routine traffic accident cases. The Court of Appeal
and the House of Lords grappled with the fundamentals and the rea-
sonableness of the CFA, the success uplift, and the ATE insurance
premium. The English Rule had always prohibited a prevailing party
from recovering more than reasonable fees and costs. To explicate cer-
tain fundamental principles associated with reasonableness, the
Court of Appeal in Callery No. 1 raised two questions: When would it
79. Callery v. Gray, [2001] 3 All E.R. 833 (C.A.) [Callery No. 1].
80. Callery v. Gray (No. 2), [2001] 4 All E.R. 1 (C.A.) [Callery No. 2].
81. Callery v. Gray (Nos. 1 & 2), [2002] 3 All E.R. 417 (H.L.) (deciding the appeals
from Callery No. 1 and Callery No. 2 together) [Callery (H.L.)].
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be reasonable for a claimant to sign a CFA with a success fee and to
take out an ATE policy?; and, with respect to the CFA, What percent-
age success uplift would be reasonable in any given case?
Defendant liability insurance companies asked the court to focus
on each individual case in deciding if the fees and success uplift were
reasonable. Since risks differed in each individual case, they argued
that it would never be reasonable to enter into a CFA with a success
uplift until the solicitor knew, or had a good idea, of the actual risk.
From their perspective, there was little doubt that the first meeting of
claimant and solicitor was too soon since the case might settle during
the protocol period, in which case there would be no risk.
In Callery No. 1, Lord Woolf rejected this individualistic approach
and adopted a broader perspective. For him (and he was not re-
versed), the major issue was whether an early commitment to a CFA
with a success uplift was needed to encourage legitimate claimants to
bring their suits and to encourage solicitors to take these routine
cases. The purposes of the second revised litigation funding system
was to facilitate access to justice on the part of those who could not
afford the costs of litigation and to reduce the burden on legal aid.82
With these goals in mind, he believed that it was reasonable to "take a
global view" of the problem.8 3 He believed, as a practical matter, that
claimants and solicitors would not proceed unless they could enter
into a CFA at the earliest possible moment.
In determining the appropriate success uplift percentage, Lord
Woolf did not focus on the risk in an individual case; instead, he con-
tinued his broad analysis. The issue was what was necessary for a
solicitor "carrying on litigation business on a large scale" to achieve a
"reasonable return overall."84 Where the solicitor carries on a large-
scale litigation business, it is necessary to permit the solicitor to claim
an uplift sufficient to provide him with a reasonable return overall on
a particular class of litigation.8 5 Lord Woolf then rather arbitrarily
concluded that the maximum success uplift in these routine traffic ac-
cident cases should be no more than twenty percent.8 6 He worried,
82. Callery No. 1, [2001] 3 All E.R. para. 92, at 853.
83. Id. para. 93, at 853.
84. Id. paras. 82-83, at 851.
85. Id. para. 83, at 851.
86. Id. para. 133, at 860. One commentator believed that Lord Woolf had simply
"pick[ed] a figure out of the air." Michael Zander, Where Are We Now on Condi-
tional Fees?-Or Why this Emperor Is Wearing Few, If Any, Clothes, 65 MOD. L.
REV. 919, 925 (2002).
There is support for this critical conjecture. In Halloran v. Delaney, [20031 1
All E.R. 775 (C.A. 2002), the court revised the permissible percentage uplift to
five percent. Then, in the Matter of Claims Direct Test Cases, [2003] P.I.Q.R.
P31, [2003] E.W.C.A. 136 (C.A.), the court qualified its prior remarks. It said:
Halloran v Delaney... was concerned with an extremely simple road
traffic accident claim which was swiftly settled for £1,500 with a mini-
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however, that even this figure was too high, and he recommended a
two-stage conditional fee with a lower percentage uplift if the case set-
tled early in the litigation process.8 7
Lord Woolf recognized the "inevitable [macro] consequences" of the
second revised litigation funding system. Where once the claimant
and the taxpayer, through the public support of legal aid, bore the
costs for these routine accident cases, the costs were now shifted to
defendant insurance companies through the payment of small success
uplifts. Since these payments kept the efficient, large-scale firm in
business with a reasonable return overall, the insurance companies
were, in effect, funding all litigation, including that of losing claim-
ants.8 8 Lord Woolf was not alarmed. Since the same liability insur-
ance companies were frequently repeat players in the system, any
given company would, in the long run, make many small success fee
payments rather than a few large ones.8 9 This was not only as a gen-
mum of fuss and bother. In para.32 of my judgment I referred to the
court's description of Callery v Gray as a "modest and straightforward
claim for compensation for personal injuries resulting from a traffic acci-
dent . . .where there was no special feature that raised apprehension
that the claim might not prove to be sound". In paras [34]-[36] I sug-
gested the approach that judges should adopt in future when appraising
the appropriateness of a success fee "in claims as simple as this".
Subsequent events have shown that I should have expressed myself
with greater clarity. The type of case to which I was referring was a case
similar to Callery v Gray and Halloran v Delaney in which, to adopt the
'ready reckoner" in Cook on Costs 2003, p.545, the prospects of success
are virtually 100 per cent. The two-step fee advocated by the court in
Callery v Gray (No. 1) is apt to allow a solicitor in such a case to cater for
the wholly unexpected risk lurking below the limpid waters of the sim-
plest of claims. It did not require any research evidence or submissions
from other parties in the industry to persuade the court that in this type
of extremely simple claim a success fee of over 5 per cent was no longer
tenable in all the circumstances. The guidance given in that judgment
was not intended to have any wider application.
Id. paras. 100-01.
87. Callery No. 1, [2001] 3 All E.R. paras. 104-16, at 855-57.
88. See id. paras. 96-100, at 853-54.
89. See id. para. 99, at 854. Lord Woolf explained:
If the new regime is to achieve its object, the legal costs of claimants
whose claims fail should fall to be borne by unsuccessful defendants in
the manner described in [93] above. On these appeals the Court has to
decide whether to permit liability for success fees to be apportioned in
relatively small amounts among many unsuccessful defendants, or to in-
sist on an approach under which they will be borne in much larger
amounts by those unsuccessful defendants who persist in contesting
liability.
In relation to claims arising out of road accidents, where defendants
will be insured, the same insurers will often be sharing the costs in-
volved, whether in the form of many uniform small aplifts or fewer large
uplifts.
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eral matter substantively fair, but if the success uplift was based on
individual cases, there would be a perverse result. Defendants with
the best cases (and therefore cases in which the claimants' solicitors
would necessarily seek higher success fees to cover the legitimate
risks involved) would, in the event of losing, be forced to pay a higher
uplift amount than would a defendant with a weaker case. Lord Woolf
explained:
If the latter alternative [i.e., success uplift based on individual cases] is
adopted, the defendants who contest liability will not share liability for costs
in a manner which is equitable. Where there is a strong defence which it is
reasonable to advance, a larger uplift will be [more] appropriate than where a
defendant unreasonably persists in contesting liability despite the fact that
the defence is weak. Thus the more reasonable the conduct of the defendant,
the larger the uplift that he will have to pay if his defence fails.9 0
Defendant insurance companies also challenged the recoverability
of ATE insurance premiums. A similar question arose in the ATE in-
surance context as it had in the CFA context: When was it reasonable
to take out ATE insurance? The insurance companies again argued
that since the risk in an individual case would not be known at the
first meeting of claimant and solicitor, it was, ipso facto, unreasonable
to purchase insurance at that time. If the case might easily settle dur-
ing the mandatory protocol period, there would be no need for ATE
insurance. In Callery No. 1, the Court of Appeal (Lord Woolf) again
took a broad approach to the issue and concluded that it was reasona-
ble for a claimant to purchase an ATE insurance policy at his first
meeting with his solicitor. First, Lord Woolf referred to the ATE in-
surers' experience with cherry picking and stressed the importance of
including all claimants, including those with low-risk cases, in the in-
surance pool. This would keep the premium cost at a reasonable
level.9 1 Second, without ATE insurance, risk-averse claimants would
be reluctant to seek legal recourse. 92
90. Id.
91. See id. (discussing that "unless the policy is taken out before it is known whether
a defendant is going to contest liability, the premium is going to rise substan-
tially" and that in such circumstances cover may not be available).
92. Although the courts agreed that it was reasonable to take out an after-the-event
insurance policy at the inception of the relationship, they still insisted that solici-
tors make at least some inquiry to assure that there is not another convenient
way to fund the claimant's litigation. In another important case in 2001, Sarwar
v. Alam, [20011 4 All E.R. 541 (C.A.), the claimant had been a passenger in the
defendant's car. The solicitor agreed to take the case on a conditional fee basis,
and the claimant bought an after-the-event insurance policy at that first meeting.
It was later discovered that the driver's before-the-event insurance policy would
have afforded the passenger adequate legal insurance to maintain the case.
Under these circumstances, it was not reasonable to recover the after-the-event
insurance premium from the losing opponent. The solicitor, at this first meeting,
had an obligation to make sure that claimants did not have other ways, such as
insurance, to maintain the case. This would not require an exhaustive search,
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Lord Woolf recognized that ultimately the insurance companies
paid the litigation funding costs, but he thought that this was a fair
result. As with CFAs and success uplifts, the question was whether a
particular defendant insurance company would pay many low ATE
premiums or a few high ones, and since the same liability insurers
engaged in the business, it did not matter over a large range of cases.
Moreover, Lord Woolf reminded insurance companies that they were
the ultimate beneficiaries of ATE insurance. Without these policies in
place, it would, as a practical matter, be unlikely that even prevailing
insurance companies would recover their costs. Many individual
claimants simply did not have the resources. ATE insurance, in es-
sence, created a resource pool for the insurer's own ultimate benefit.93
The House of Lords decided the appeals from Callery No. 1 (to-
gether with the Callery No. 2 appeals9 4) one year later on June 27,
2002.95 All the Lords except one-Lord Scott of Foscote, who voted for
reversal-dismissed the appeals. They all believed that regardless of
the merits, these issues were best left to the Court of Appeal and the
lower courts.96 Thus, Lord Woolfs analysis remains decisive. Still, all
the Law Lords had serious misgivings about the second revised litiga-
tion funding system.9 7
but, at the least, the solicitor should request that his client bring relevant insur-
ance policies, etc., to the first meeting. Id. para. 45, at 554.
93. See Callery No. 1, [2001] 3 All E.R. para. 99, at 854 ("So far as insurance premi-
ums are concerned, these will produce cover which benefits the defendants, for
they will ensure that costs are awarded against unsuccessful claimants and that
such awards are satisfied.").
94. Callery No. 2 will.be discussed infra. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying
text.
95. Callery v. Gray (Nos. 1 & 2), [2002] 3 All E.R. 417 (H.L.) [Callery (H.L.)].
96. For example, Lord Bingham of Cornhill wrote:
For these reasons (and those given by my noble and learned friends Lord
Nicholls of Birkenhead and Lord Hope of Craighead) I would dismiss
this appeal. In doing so I would not wish to discount either the risk of
abuse or the need to check any practices which may undermine the fair-
ness of the new funding regime. This should operate so as to promote
access to justice but not so as to confer disproportionate benefits on legal
practitioners or after the event insurers or impose unfair burdens on de-
fendants or their insurers. I feel sure that district and costs judges, cir-
cuit judges and in the last resort the Court of Appeal can be relied on to
maintain a fair and publicly beneficial balance between competing
interests.
Id. para. 10, at 422. The Law Lords were told that some 150,000 cases awaited
the outcome. Zander, supra note 86, at 919.
97. See Jeremy Cochran, Callery: PI Solicitors Still Ensnared in Fog, L. GAZErrE, IT
7-8 (Dec. 7, 2002), available at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/gazetteinpractice/
archivearticleframe.asp?ArticleName=/Gazettearchive/2002-07-12/28arch.txt.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill remarked on the obvious force in the appel-
lant's contention that even the 20% success uplift provided a generous
level of reward for Mr. Callery's solicitors, and given the minuscule risk
of failure which his claim apparently presented, that it would have been
2004] THE ENGLISH COSTS WAR
First, the Law Lords believed that claimants operated in a "costs-
free and risk-free zone."98 Since claimants would never be responsible
for the uplift or the insurance premium, they would be indifferent to
the amounts they agreed to pay their solicitors and the insurance com-
panies. The only check, most of the Lords believed, was "how much
the costs judge will allow on an assessment against the liability
insurer."9 9
Second, the Lords strongly suggested that Lord Woolf's broad ap-
proach was inappropriate. They thought decisions with respect to
risks ought to be made in each individual case. 10 0 Taxation judges
were accustomed to making comparative judgments about costs one
case at a time. When there was no good basis for comparison, the rea-
soning would, by necessity, be circular. The Court explained:
[S]olicitors offering motor accident personal injury CFAs have no incentive to
compete on the success fees they charge. So the next question is whether a
decision of a costs judge, or the Court of Appeal on appeal from a costs judge,
is the best way of compensating for the absence of price competition in the
market. The traditional function of the costs judge, or taxing master, as he
used to be called, was to decide what fees were reasonable by reference to his
experience of the general level of fees being charged for comparable work. But
this approach only makes sense if the general level of fees is itself directly or
indirectly determined by market forces. Otherwise the exercise becomes cir-
cular and costs judges will be deciding what is reasonable according to general
levels which costs judges themselves have determined. In such circumstances
there is no restraint upon a ratchet effect whereby the highest success fees
obtainable from a costs judge are relied upon in subsequent assessments.101
Taxation judges, moreover, were certainly not competent to make
decisions about what would be a "reasonable rate of return" for a
"large scale" law firm. Indeed, what did these words mean? These
were more appropriately legislative or regulatory matters. "Once one
invokes a global approach designed to produce a reasonable overall
return for solicitors, one moves away from the judicial function of the
reasonable to await a reply from Mr. Gray before obtaining ATE insur-
ance cover. What might reasonably be interpreted as disquiet was also
obvious in the speeches of Lord Hoffman and Lord Hope of Craighead,
who categorised the claimant's exposure to risk as being 'at the worst,
minimal'. Nonetheless, the House of Lords emphasised that responsibil-
ity for monitoring and controlling the developing practice in the field of
conditional fees lies with the Court of Appeal. That being so, the Lords
would not interfere with its decision.
Lord Scott of Foscote dissented, his speech including a detailed analy-
sis of CFAs, together with careful explanation of the fact that the costs of
each case are to be quantified for the claim in question and on the nature
of the particular claim.
Id.
98. Callery (H.L.), [2002] 3 All E.R. para. 12, at 422.
99. Id. para. 43, at 429. See id. para. 25, at 424-25.
100. See id. para. 114, at 443.
101. Id. para. 32, at 426.
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costs judge and into the territory of legislative or administrative
decision."10 2
Third, the Law Lords were generally skeptical about the practical-
ity of such a broad approach. Early CFAs with success uplifts might
not be necessary to encourage legitimate claims. Solicitors might, as a
marketing ploy, for example, take the case on a speculative basis. 103
The Law Lords also suspected that this "different kind of taxation"
argument for recoverable insurance premiums was fundamentally un-
fair. Lord Woolf s argument, based on a wide pool of premium payers
(what the Law Lords called the "many should pay for the few" princi-
ple), did not fit the facts. It was not the other insured claimants who
ultimately paid for premiums; rather, it was their losing opponents in
litigation. 104
b. Brief Comparison with the United States Supreme Court
The introduction of the CFA into a funding system that used the
English Rule was the root cause of the problems. Although in the con-
text of public interest litigation, the United States Supreme Court
dealt with a similar set of problems in the mid-1980s and early
1990s.10 5 On the basic issues, most of the Justices were aligned with
102. Id. para. 35, at 427. Lord Hoffman elaborated:
It seems to me likely (although reliable statistical evidence is not pres-
ently available) that the costs which can reasonably be expended in a
small personal injury claim conducted in accordance with the protocol
and which settles within the protocol period are unlikely in the great
majority of cases to vary much from the statistical mean. The present
case-letter before action acknowledgment of liability, medical report
and a relatively brief negotiation-must be fairly typical. It involves
standardised legal services at a fairly low level. This would suggest that
these costs-both the basic costs and the success fee-should be fixed by
the rules which apply in all but exceptional circumstances. I understand
that such a system is under consideration by the Civil Justice Council. A
legislative decision to fix costs at levels calculated to provide adequate
access to justice in the most economical way seems to me a more rational
approach then to leave the matter to individual costs judges. If it is con-
sidered the most appropriate way to secure value for money when the
expenditure is borne by the public as a whole (as for example, in the
fixing of graduated fees for criminal legal aid) it should be no less appro-
priate when the expenditure is borne by a section of the public, namely
the motorists. Not only would this be more likely to keep the actual
costs within reasonable levels but it would also greatly reduce the cost of
disputes over costs. We were told that no less than 150,000 cases
awaited the outcome of your Lordships' decision in this case.
Id. para. 36, at 427-28.
103. See id. paras. 111-12, at 442-43.
104. See id. para. 112, at 443.
105. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) [Delaware Valley II];
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546
(1986) [Delaware Valley I].
[Vol. 83:114
THE ENGLISH COSTS WAR
the Law Lords, rather than the Court of Appeal. In the United States,
contingent fee agreements were, of course, a common way to fund liti-
gation. After the federal government introduced one-way fee shifting
to advance certain social causes, such as in the Solid Waste Disposal
Act,1 0 6 the Supreme Court, in Dague, Delaware Valley I, and Dela-
ware Valley II, answered the question: Would the prevailing party's
lawyer be able to recover her fee plus a contingency enhancement to
compensate her for the risk that she might lose the case and be paid
nothing?1O7
The principal disagreement among the Justices was analogous to
the disagreement among Lord Woolf and the Law Lords. Should the
focus be on a risk assessment in an individual case as the Law Lords
argued? Or, is it better to emphasize a broader approach to determine
if the fee arrangement is necessary to assure the availability of legal
services, as Lord Woolf believed?
All the Justices agreed that the initial starting point for determin-
ing recoverable legal fees was the "lodestar" method. This method pri-
marily factored hours and billing rates. With such a starting point,
was a contingency enhancement to cover risk reasonable? The plural-
ity, led by Justices White and Scalia, used, as the Law Lords did, an
individualistic approach to conclude that there should be no enhance-
ment. First, it would often be difficult to assess the precise risk in
each case, particularly given the fact there was no comparable market
for the services. Second, the lodestar methodology would cover the
problem in each separate case. Since more difficult cases would be
riskier and more difficult to prove, they would take more time and
more senior talent, and, therefore, pursuant to the lodestar approach,
a prevailing litigant would be entitled to a higher reasonable fee.1os If
a contingency fee enhancement were allowed, the end result would be
a higher fee and, essentially, a double recovery.
Third, many of the Justices were skeptical about whether the con-
tingency fee was necessary to attract competent counsel. Justice
White believed that competent counsel, often provided by organiza-
tions devoted to a cause, could readily be found in most cases.10 9
Fourth, contrary to Lord Woolf's reasoning, Justice Scalia noted differ-
ent perverse consequences of providing a contingency enhancement
based on risk and difficulty.110 Since less meritorious law suits
tended to be riskier, affording a contingency enhancement based on
risk and difficulty would encourage the filing of these unwanted suits.
106. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000).
107. Kritzer, supra note 15, at 1946.
108. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563; Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 726.
109. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563; Delaware Valley 1, 478 U.S. at 565.
110. Dague, 505 U.S. at 562-63.
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Several Justices dissented. Their focus, as was Lord Woolfs, was
global. The issue was whether a contingency fee enhancement was
necessary to encourage lawyers to represent clients in these important
cases. Justice Blackmun believed that to focus on a particular case
was fundamentally unsound. He was concerned, as was Lord Woolf,
with providing a reasonable return overall on a particular class of liti-
gation."' A contingency enhancement for prevailing parties would ef-
fectively assure civil rights lawyers willing to take these cases the
economic stability to take additional cases. 1 12
The underlying flaw in all of these objections is that the appropriate enhance-
ment for risk does not depend, in the first instance, on the degree of risk
presented by a particular case. Enhancement for risk is not designed to equal-
ize the prospective returns among contingent cases with different degrees of
merit. Rather, it is designed simply to place contingent employment as a
whole on roughly the same economic footing as noncontingent practice, in or-
der that such cases receive the equal representation intended by Congress.
Enhancement compensates attorneys for the risk of nonpayment associated
with contingent employment, a risk that does not exist in noncontingent
cases.113
2. Deconstructing the After-the-Event Insurance Premium
In Callery No. 2,114 and later in Claims Direct,115 the Court of Ap-
peal explored the scope of the recoverable after-the-event ("ATE") in-
surance premium. This was not a trivial issue. As has been noted,
some claims management firms served as agents for risk underwrit-
ers, who reallocated a substantial part of the total insurance premium
to these firms for their services. To many, the total premium was not
really an "insurance" premium. The Claims Direct Test Cases and The
Accident Group Test Cases116 focused more closely on what was a re-
coverable premium.
Two weeks after Callery No. 1, the Court of Appeal, in Callery No.
2, more carefully discussed the meaning of the statutory language re-
lated to the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums.117 Section 29
of the Access to Justice Act of 1999 provided:
111. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 744-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112. Justice O'Connor refined Justice Blackmun's "as a whole" approach by looking at
cases "as a class." Still, she was in general agreement that it was unwise to ex-
amine risk and difficulty in each individual case. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 576
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 731-34 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
113. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 745-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (third empha-
sis added) (citations omitted).
114. Callery v. Gray (No. 2), [2001] 4 All E.R. 1 (C.A.) [Callery No. 2].
115. In re Claims Direct Test Cases, [2003] 4 All E.R. 508 (C.A.) [Claims Direct No. 2].
116. Sharratt v. London Cent. Bus Co. Ltd. (The Accident Group Test Cases), [20031 4
All E.R. 590 (C.A.) [The Accident Group Test Cases].
117. Callery No. 2, [2001] 4 All E.R. 1. Lord Phillips authored this opinion. Lord
Woolf was absent. The House of Lords reluctantly affirmed.
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Where in any proceedings a costs order is made in favour of any party who has
taken out an insurance policy against the risk of incurring a liability in those
proceedings, the costs payable to him may, subject in the case of court pro-
ceedings to rules of court, include costs in respect of the premium of the
policy. 1 18
Lord Phillips stated that section 29 insurance covered "the risk of in-
curring a costs liability that cannot be passed on to the opposing
party."119 How widely, however, did this phrase reach?
In addressing these issues, Lord Phillips made three important
points, all of which would become relevant in the costs war. First, he
determined that, regardless of the reasons why the claimant failed to
recover costs, ATE insurance could cover him. This would even be
true, for example, if the claimant could not recover costs due to his
own fault, such as his refusal to accept a reasonable settlement offer,
or to his own dilatory actions. The costs remained "a liability that
cannot be passed on to the opposing party."12o Second, Lord Phillips
decided that, as a matter of principle, ATE insurance could cover the
claimant against his own costs, including the insurance premium. In-
surance covered the risks of a fortuity, and the fortuitous reason that
the claimant could not recover these costs was that he did not prevail
in his lawsuit.121 Finally, and almost as an unexplored afterthought,
he concluded that the £350 premium in the Callery litigation was
reasonable.122
118. Id. para. 6, at 5 (quoting Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 29 (Eng.)).
119. Callery No. 2, [2001] 4 All E.R. para. 59, at 15.
120. Id.
121. See id. para. 38, at 11.
In essence this argument [by the defendant] was simply that it was
unfair to defendants that claimants should be able to pass on to them
liability for insuring against costs liabilities of such a type in that those
liabilities are likely to have been incurred as a result of failure on the
part of claimants to conduct the litigation in a reasonable manner.
It seems to us that such an argument would frequently be open to
relation to costs which follow the event after a claim fails. All four cate-
gories of risk aptly fall within the words "risk of incurring a costs liabil-
ity in the proceedings". In our judgment insurance against such risks
falls within the ambit of section 29.
Id. paras. 30-31, at 10.
The court did express one reservation with respect to this expansive interpre-
tation. It was uncertain if a recoverable section 29 premium would cover the full
premium rebate (if claimant should lose) or the partial premium rebate or the
ring-fencing of damages.
In this context our only reservation arises in relation to the premium
rebate provision in condition 6. As we have indicated, however, this is of
no practical significance in the present case and we consider that it is
better that the issue of whether the cost of such cover is recoverable
under section 29 should be dealt with in a case where this matters.
Id. para. 62, at 16.
122. Id. para. 70, at 17.
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In the course of his analysis, Lord Phillips drew an important dis-
tinction that would soon become relevant in the "guerrilla warfare."
The recoverable section 29 premium was limited to that part of the
premium that was properly allocatable to insurance benefits, not to
other noninsurance benefits. If the total premium covered other con-
tractual benefits in its bundled basket of services, it was suggested
that the prevailing party could not recover the related part of the pre-
mium.1 23 In deciding this matter, Lord Phillips also explained to
judges, who would have to decide these matters in the future, that
their analytic focus should not be on how the insurance company used
the revenues, for that question is one of internal business
operations.12 4
In the Claims Direct litigation, the Court of Appeal further ex-
plored the meaning of recoverable ATE premium. It referred a num-
ber of questions to the Chief Taxing Master for his opinion.
Illustrative of how bitter the costs struggle had become by this time,
the litigants even disputed and appealed the Taxing Master's procedu-
ral approach to the issues. In March 2002, the Court of Appeal re-
solved the procedural issue by refusing to interfere with the Master's
approach. 12 5 The Court, however, reiterated its Callery No. 2 distinc-
tion that the recoverable premium only related to that portion that
was for insurance benefits and not collateral benefits.12 6
Lady Justice Arden also added some refinements to Lord Phillips's
distinction between insurance benefits and contracted-for collateral
benefits. First, recoverable section 29 insurance premiums were not
so severely limited as to exclude reasonable marketing and managing
expenses, such as sales commissions. 127 Moreover, these legitimate
insurance services need not be handled in-house and the risk insurer
could outsource the work to another company. 128 Second, she recom-
mended that one important way to ascertain if a section 29 premium
was reasonable was to use a cross-check and compare the total costs
123. See id. para. 12, at 6.
124. See id. para. 13, at 6-7.
125. See In re Claims Direct Test Cases, [2002] EWCA Civ 428, paras. 29-32 (C.A.)
[Claims Direct No. 1].
126. See id. paras. 7, 12.
127. See id. para. 44. Lady Justice Arden wrote:
In my judgment, premium is not necessarily limited to payments paid on
inception of cover, but could include any further amounts paid by, or on
behalf of the insured, pursuant to terms agreed with the insurer. The
premium could also include sums paid to the benefit of the insurer. We
are told that the insurer has, in effect, outsourced claims administration.
The cost of this is borne by Claims Direct on behalf of underwriters. Any
part of the sum paid by the insured which is devoted to this purpose may
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associated with an ATE-insurance-based approach to the total costs of
funding litigation with alternative funding methods.129
One year later, in February 2003, after receiving the Taxing
Master's lengthy report of 236 paragraphs, the Court of Appeal ad-
dressed some of these important substantive issues.1 30 The claims
management firm argued, of course, that the entire premium was re-
coverable.i 3 1 The defendant liability insurance companies were par-
ticularly skeptical about the reallocation to the claims management
firm for insurance services.132 Lord Justice Brooke essentially agreed
with the insurance companies, stating that in exceptional cases where
a bundle of services are provided, it is appropriate for the taxing
master "to lift the veil and to be influenced by what was actually being
129. Lady Arden explained:
Nevertheless, in my judgment, the comparison between the cover pro-
vided by these appellants and other means of financing litigation, includ-
ing other insurance cover, is a relevant consideration to which the
appellants could properly bring to the attention of the Senior Costs
Judge. I say this, bearing in mind the general purposes of the new meth-
ods of funding litigation introduced by the 1999 Act and by the fact that
it is obviously highly desirable in the interests ofjustice that these meth-
ods should be competitive. A premium may not be reasonable if there
are alternative ways of providing the same funding at significantly less
expense.
Id.
130. In re Claims Direct Test Cases, [2003] 4 All E.R. 508 (C.A.) [Claims Direct No. 2].
131. The English Civil Procedure Rules are supplemented with Practice Directions.
Section 11:10 of the Practice Direction for Rule 44 explains:
In deciding whether the cost of insurance cover is reasonable, relevant
factors to be taken into account include:
(1) where the insurance cover is not purchased in support of a condi-
tional fee agreement with a success fee, how its cost compares with
the likely cost of funding the case with a conditional fee agreement
with a success fee and supporting insurance cover;
(2) the level and extent of the cover provided;
(3) the availability of any pre-existing insurance cover;
(4) whether any part of the premium would be rebated in the event of
early settlement;
(5) the amount of commission payable to the receiving party or his legal
representatives or other agents.
ENG. CIv. P.R., COSTS PRAc. DIRECTION § 11.10 (2004) ("Factors to be Taken Into
Account in Deciding the Amount of Costs: Rule 44.5"), available at http://www.
dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/pdf/practice directions/pd-parts43-48.pdf.
The Claims Direct No. 1 Court said that "[t]he second preliminary issue
sought by the appellants seeks to confine the inquiry by the Senior Costs Judge to
comparing the premium paid by the claimants in these test cases with alterna-
tive methods of financing litigation, rather than into the reasonableness of the
particular components of the premium." [2002] EWCA Civ 428, para. 45.
132. The Court adopted the following definition for premium: "The premium is the
consideration required of the assured in return for which the insurer undertakes
his obligation under the contract of insurance." Claims Direct No. 2, [2003] 4 All




provided in return for the premium allocation."133 In other words,
they were to deconstruct the premium. Lord Justice Brooke gave the
following simple analogy:
It was not, in my judgment, the intention of Parliament when it enacted sec-
tion 29 of the 1999 Act to overload the recoverable premium by adding to the
costs customarily embraced by such a premium the costs which a company
like [the claims management company] had to incur if insurers were to accept
the risk at all. I would look equally askance at the recoverability, in similar
circumstances, of a premium for a fire policy which included the cost the in-
sured had to incur in installing and maintaining a sprinkler system as a con-
dition for his insurance cover, or a premium for a household insurance policy
which included the cost of installing and maintaining a burglar alarm.
1 3 4
The Lord Justice distinguished two aspects of the services bundled
in the insurance premium. Initial insurance services were either re-
lated to the claimant's application for ATE insurance or were related
to reports made to the insurance company.13 5 Continuing insurance
services were more closely connected with necessary litigation man-
agement, and were similar, if not identical, to the litigation services
Claims Direct had provided solicitors for a fee in its first business plan
described.' 36 Lord Justice Brooke found only the first group (i.e., ini-
tial insurance services) part of the recoverable premium. He believed
that it was most unlikely that the second set of litigation management
services had mysteriously morphed into the ATE insurance:
There is a particular feature here which is bound to excite attention. The
services provided for the claimants were in most respects identical under the
Portfolio Scheme and the Claims Direct Protect Scheme. How then can it be
said that all the claims handling services (previously remunerated out of
Claims Direct's 30% share of the award in successful cases) suddenly became
insurance services when an ATE insurance element was added to the pack-
age? This consideration alone is sufficient to put a costs judge on inquiry.1 3 7
Lord Justice Brooke finally noted that if these collateral benefits
were truly litigation services, as he believed they were, then this was
the sort of work normally done by solicitors. Since a solicitor could
outsource this work, a prevailing party, in proper circumstances,
133. Claims Direct No. 2, [2003] 4 All E.R. para. 86, at 527-28.
134. Id. para. 88, at 528.
135. These benefits included: the completion of the claims management firm's form;
arranging for the client to complete a credit agreement form; forwarding the ap-
plication form; monitoring the conduct of the appointed representative during the
course of the legal proceedings and reporting to the insurance company; and
maintaining relevant financial information for the insurance company. Id. para.
52, at 521.
136. These benefits included: obtaining further information for use by solicitors; ob-
taining witness statements from clients, witnesses, and experts; and arranging
for the claimant to attend appropriate medical examinations and reviews by cost
draftsmen. Id. paras. 53-54, at 521-22.
137. Id. para. 69, at 524-25.
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might recover the costs, not as part of the insurance premium, but
rather as a normal disbursement.138
The Court of Appeal slashed the £1,250 ATE premium; it held that
only half was recoverable pursuant to section 29. The Court then in-
sisted on a proportionality cross-check of this total. The Court guess-
timated the total litigation costs if a solicitor had taken the claim
pursuant to a conditional fee agreement with a reasonable success up-
lift.139 Although the figures were not precise, the Court was satisfied
the its determination of the recoverable amount of the premium was
not disproportionate to this alternative funding method.140
3. Technical Challenges Based on Tensions Between the Second
Revised Litigation Funding System and the Indemnity
Principle
Defendant liability insurance companies also raised a number of
technical challenges to conditional fee agreements ("CFAs") in the sec-
ond revised litigation funding system.141 All were premised on a fun-
138. See id. para. 43, at 521. The Court stated:
Other activities, although nominally undertaken for the benefit of un-
derwriters, formed no part of the actual insurance since they were part
of a normal claims handling service. If these services had not been car-
ried out by the claims managers, they would have been carried out by
solicitors in the normal way. To the extent that this work was reasona-
ble and proportionate it might instead be recoverable as costs on behalf
of a successful claimant.
Id.
139. Given the difficulty of this cross-check, the Court added that if there was sole
reliance of section 11.10(1) of the Costs Practice Direction-the proportionality
standard-for determining reasonableness, there would be more uncertainty
than if the "deconstruction" method was followed. See id. para. 98, at 529-30.
140. In May 2003, the Chief Taxing Master further deconstructed the meaning of a
recoverable section 29 premium in The Accident Group Test Cases Tranche 2 Is-
sues, No. PTH 0204771 (Sup. Ct. Costs Office May 15, 2003), at http://www.court-
service.gov.ukfjudgmentsfiles/j1740/sharratt_v-central bus-co.htm. The Master
concluded that the ATE insurance policy covered, among other things, the losing
claimant's own costs, the costs of funding the bank loan, the prevailing party's
costs, and the ATE insurance premium.
The Chief Taxing Master discussed these issues at length. In deconstructing
the policy, he decided that the part of the premium associated with the following
two benefits was not recoverable: the portion related to insuring the borrowing
costs associated with the payment of the premium, and the amount associated
with the solicitor's payment for litigation services.
The Master also addressed whether the part of the premium associated with
the ATE insurance benefit that would indemnify the claimant, in the event of a
loss, for the premium itself was recoverable. Although he did not resolve the is-
sue, he emphasized circularity of this benefit. If the policy covered the premium,
this would justify a higher premium, resulting in greater risk, justifying a still
higher premium. See id. paras. 249-52.
141. One of the earliest challenges tested the new CFAs against the requirements of
the Consumer Credit Act of 1974. It was not uncommon for after-the-event insur-
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damental tension caused by the indemnity principle. 14 2 These
skirmishes have caused most of the expensive and time-consuming
satellite litigation. Although the Access to Justice Act of 1999 pro-
vided a means for abrogating the indemnity principle in certain cases,
there was no clear modification until the 2003 Regulations.
Although the indemnity principle's origins are uncertain, it is a
well-established concomitant to the English Rule. The principle pro-
vides that a prevailing party can only recover fees and costs for which
he is legally obligated. Thus, if a contingent fee arrangement was un-
enforceable, a prevailing party who had no obligation to pay it would
not be entitled to recover it from the losing litigant. In light of uncer-
tainty with respect to the indemnity principle, solicitors and claimants
frequently disguised the true nature of their CFAs. Although it was
tacitly understood that claimants would be under no obligation to pay,
this was not stated clearly in their agreements. This nontransparency
frequently led to confusion and uncertainty.
Defendant insurance companies seized on this principle as a
means of thwarting the paying of CFA fees, success uplifts, and insur-
ance premiums. During the period from 2000 to 2003, they claimed
that they were always entitled (1) to examine the CFA, (2) to deter-
mine if the CFA included the required content, and (3) to ascertain if
the legal representative had adequately informed the client of the
CFA's provisions. If the CFA was defective or if the client-care provi-
sions had not been complied with, then, the companies argued, the
CFA was unenforceable, and, therefore, pursuant to the indemnity
principle, unrecoverable. To many this seemed like nitpicky and ob-
structionistic behavior. Although these technical challenges were
often dropped before the detailed assessment, they were designed in
ance companies not to require the premium payment until after the lawsuit, and,
if the amount recovered was less than the premium, to require payment of only
that amount, and, if the claimant lost, not to require any payment at all. In Tilby
v. Perfect Pizza Ltd., No. MC 003838, at paras. 14-17 (Sup. Ct. Costs Office Feb.
28, 2002), at http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfilesj1231/Tilbyv_
PerfectPizza.htm, the paying party argued that this type of arrangement consti-
tuted the granting of credit, and, therefore, must comply with the processes set
out in the Consumer Credit Act of 1974. Senior Costs Judge Hurst denied the
claim. Although many insurance premiums were paid at the inception of the pol-
icy, there had been no established practice for the after-the-event insurance pol-
icy. Relying on the observation that "litigants in general might be put off
litigating if they had to pay significant amounts of money, such as insurance pre-
miums at the outset of their claim," id. para. 34, together with the lack of estab-
lished practice, the judge held that there was no need to comply with the
consumer protect law. The claimant could therefore recover the insurance pre-
mium. Id. paras. 37-42.
142. Lord Justice Brooke described this as a form of "trench warfare." Sharratt v.
London Cent. Bus Co. Ltd. (The Accident Group Test Cases), [2003] 4 All E.R.
590, para. 42, at 605-06 (C.A.) [The Accident Group Test Cases].
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part to delay payments. 143 This materially disrupted the cash flow of
those large-scale firms that handled many claimants' cases. 144
Parliament and the courts had, perhaps inadvertently, invited this
reaction. Prior to the revised litigation funding systems, conditional
fees would have clearly been champertous and unenforceable. The
CFA regulations changed this, but due to restrictive and narrow inter-
pretation, there remained a great deal of room to explore for technical
violations.145
At first, it appeared that the courts would interpret the CFA regu-
lations liberally. In 1998, in Thai Trading Co. v. Taylor,14 6 the Court
of Appeal quickly extended the regulatory reach. Lord Millet con-
cluded the first revised litigation funding systems ushered in a new
era in litigation funding. If there was no substantive harm, such
agreements would be enforceable. He wrote:
Current attitudes to these questions are exemplified by the passage into law
of the Courts and Legal Services Act [ofl 1990. This shows that the fear that
lawyers may be tempted by having a financial incentive in the outcome of
litigation to act improperly is exaggerated, and that there is a countervailing
public policy in making justice readily accessible to persons of modest means.
Legislation was needed to authorise the increase in the lawyer's reward over
and above his ordinary profit costs. It by no means follows that it was needed
to legitimise the long-standing practice of solicitors to act for meritorious cli-
ents without means, and it is in the public interest that they should continue
to do SO.
1 4 7
This permissive attitude, however, was soon halted. The Access to
Justice Act of 1999 addressed the issue by clearly stating that only
complying CFAs were enforceable and "any other conditional fee
agreement shall be unenforceable."148 In 1999, in Awwad v. Geraghty
& Co.,149 the Court of Appeal determined, at least for lawyers, this
meant what it said.150
143. See id. para. 46, at 606.
144. This was of particular concern to those firms that had invested in costly informa-
tion technology in order to develop a large-scale personal injury compensation
practice. Id. para. 39, at 605.
145. The Access to Justice Act authorized enforceable CFAs that complied with the
regulations for those persons who "conduct litigation or provide advocacy ser-
vices." Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 27 (Eng.) (amending Courts and Legal
Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 58 (Eng.)).
146. [19981 Q.B. 781 (Eng. C.A.).
147. Id. at 790.
148. Access to Justice Act, 1999, c. 22, § 27 (Eng.) (amending Courts and Legal Ser-
vices Act, 1990, c. 41, § 58 (Eng.)).
149. [20001 All E.R. 608 (C.A. 1999).
150. In Awwad, Lord Schiemann wrote:
But it is a subject upon which there are sharply divergent opinions and
where I should hesitate to suppose that my opinion, or that of any indi-
vidual judge, could readily or convincingly be regarded as representing a
consensus sufficient to sustain a public policy. The difficulties and de-
lays surrounding the introduction of conditional fee agreements permit-
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The insurance companies first claimed that they should be able to
examine CFAs in order to determine if there had been compliance.
Claimants, of course, resisted that position, fearing that the compa-
nies would "scour CFAs for defects." 15 1 In the spring of 2003, in The
Accident Group Test Cases,152 the Court of Appeal clearly addressed
the issue. Lord Justice Brooke understood that there must be a bal-
ancing of interests between a claimant and her solicitor's privacy
rights and the appropriate protection of the paying party's rights. He
concluded that ordinarily claimants ought to disclose their agree-
ments. There was nothing in the legislation indicating paying parties
were not entitled to this minimal protection.153 At the least, they
should be able to examine the evidence. "[I]t should become normal
practice for a CFA to be disclosed for the purpose of costs proceedings
in which a success fee is claimed." 15 4 In distinguishing what appeared
to be contrary caselaw, he emphasized that the CFA disclosures were
not the traditional type of costs disclosure (e.g., hours of work), but
that they were, instead, considerably more complex. Since compliance
questions were issues of law, it was sensible to permit the paying
party to effectively argue its case. 5 5 If the receiving party needed to
protect some information, he concluded that confidential information
could be redacted.156 Moreover, the claimant could always elect not to
ted by statute emphasise the divergence of view. In my judgement,
where Parliament has, by what are now (with section 27 of the Access to
Justice Act [ofl 1999) successive enactments, modified the law by which
any arrangement to receive a contingency fee was impermissible, there
is no present room for the court, by an application of what is perceived to
be public policy, to go beyond that which Parliament has provided. That
applied with, if anything, greater force in 1993 than it does today.
Id. at 634-35.
151. Sharratt v. London Cent. Bus Co. Ltd. (The Accident Group Test Cases), [2003] 4
All E.R. 590, para. 41, at 605 (C.A.) [The Accident Group Test Cases].
152. Id.
153. Id. paras. 83-84, at 616-17.
154. Id. para. 220, at 643.
155. The Court rejected claimants' argument that the receiving party's solicitor's certi-
fication was adequate proof of compliance with the CFA regulations. The certifi-
cate may not provide the "quality and quantity" of information needed to resolve
legal issues. Indeed, the solicitor himself has no special expertise in deciding
questions of legality. Id. paras. 64-71, at 611-13.
156. The Court drew the disclosure line at other documents, such as attendance notes.
The receiving party need not disclose these unless the paying party can demon-
strate a "genuine issue as to whether there was compliance" with the regulations.
Id. para. 81, at 616. The apparent distinction was that the former were issues of
law and the latter were more closely related to fact issues. A solicitor's certificate
of compliance properly established a rebuttable presumption of compliance in
these circumstances.
The appellants in the present cases also seek disclosure of the attend-
ance notes prepared by the receiving parties' solicitors showing compli-
ance with regulation 4. We do not consider that these should ordinarily
be disclosed. We consider that the costs judge should not require these
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disclose the CFA and rely on other evidence to prove an enforceable
fee.157
The Accident Group Test Cases next addressed the issue of whether
any defect in the required content of the CFA rendered it unenforce-
able.158 Although many of the content provisions were designed to
protect clients, the insurance companies examined them for defects
anyway. In Pratt v. Bull, one of the appealed cases in The Accident
to be disclosed unless there is a genuine issue as to whether there was
compliance with regulation 4. The measure of explanation given to the
client is largely a matter of fact and we consider that it is, therefore,
appropriate that the paying party should have to rebut the presumption
arising from the fact that the receiving party's solicitor, an officer of the
court, has signed the certificate of accuracy.
Id.
157. The Costs Practice Direction provides:
The court may direct the receiving party to produce any document which
in the opinion of the court is necessary to enable it to reach its decision.
These documents will, in the first instance, be produced to the court, but
the court may ask the receiving party to elect whether to disclose a par-
ticular document to the paying party in order to rely on the contents of
the document, or whether to decline disclosure and instead rely on other
evidence.
ENG. Civ. P.R., COSTS PRACTICE DIRECTION § 40.14 (2004) ("Detailed Assessment
Hearing: Rule 47.14"), available at http://www.dca.gov.uklcivil/procrules-fin/pdf/
practice-directions/pd-parts43-48.pdf.
In The Accident Group Test Cases, the Court wrote:
We conclude, therefore, that if, in costs proceedings, a party seeks to
rely on the CFA, as a matter of fairness she should ordinarily be put to
her election under the Pamplin procedure. (This procedure applies
whether or not the document is privileged. It is no answer to an exercise
of the discretion to contend that the document is privileged.) This is not
simply because of the fact of reliance but because of the centrality of the
CFA in an assessment of costs in which a CFA is relied upon. If the
party does not wish to produce the CFA, she can theoretically undertake
to prove the terms of the agreement in some other way. However, we
doubt whether costs judges will in general be prepared to accept merely
oral evidence of the existence of such an agreement and its terms. On
the other hand, the court has a discretion in putting a party to his elec-
tion to allow parts of it to be redacted if, for instance, those parts contain
material which there is a good case for saying should not be revealed to
the other party even for the purposes of the assessment only, and which
it would not be unfair to the paying party to withhold. For instance, they
may relate to legal advice on matters which have not been resolved by
the claims in respect of whose disposal the success fee is claimed (for
example, claims in separate proceedings), or further proceedings be-
tween the same parties may be anticipated. Moreover, there may be ex-
ceptional cases in which the costs judge is prepared to say that no
purpose would be served by disclosure of the CFA. However, we have
been unable to think of any circumstances in which this might arise, but
the possibility exists.
The Accident Group Test Cases, [2003] 4 All E.R. para. 80, at 616.
Whether the CFA is privileged remains an open question. The Court in The
Accident Group Test Cases, insisted, however, that the claimant must ordinarily
disclose the CFA agreement regardless of whether it is privileged. See id.
158. See id. paras. 88-116, at 617-24.
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Group Test Cases, Judge Cotterill had expressed his aggravation with
such arguments. "The defendants were not 'white knights' trying to
protect the claimant, but were attempting to mount a potentially prof-
itable exercise by exploiting any deficiency in the claimant's
paperwork or procedure."159
Another one of the appealed cases, Dunn v. Ward, illustrates the
problem. Section 2(1)(d) of the Regulations of 2000 provided that the
CFA must specify the potential amounts a claimant might have to pay
and "whether the amounts are limited by reference to the damages
which may be recovered on behalf of the client."'160 This was certainly
an important provision, and it invited confusion with American-style
contingent fees. 16 1
In Dunn, the solicitor had used a poorly drafted Law Society's
Model CFA that did not comply with the regulation in all its particu-
lars. 16 2 The insurance companies argued that this made the CFA un-
enforceable. Lord Justice Brooke concluded otherwise. In light of the
entire agreement that "spelt out with sufficient clarity" the claimant's
potential liability, it was a departure that would not materially impact
on the claimant's ability to make an informed decision.163 The CFA
was thus held enforceable.
Speaking more generally, Lord Justice Brooke offered a material-
ity test, designed to provide guidance in the future with respect to the
enforceability of CFAs. He asserted that in each particular case, the
judge should decide if the minor departure "either on its own or in
conjunction with any other such departure in this case, had a materi-
ally adverse effect either upon the protection afforded to the client or
upon the proper administration of justice."1 64 In short, it was not the
defendant's role to point out minor defects in provisions that were de-
signed to protect others. The Lord Justice recognized each case must
be decided on its own, but this process ought not to encourage insur-
ance defendants to "trawl" for violations:
This is not to encourage paying parties to trawl through the facts of each case
in order to try to discover a material breach. Quite the reverse. At the state
when the agreement has been made, acted upon, and success for the client has
been achieved, it is most unlikely that any minor shortcoming which the pay-
ing party might discover in the agreement or the procedures leading up to its
159. Judge Cotterill's assertion in Pratt v. Bull was quoted in Neil Rose, Claimants
Win CFA Appeals, L. Soc'Y GAZErrE (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.
lawgazette.co.uk/news/archivearticleframe.asp?ArticleName=/Gazettearchive/
2002-11-14/43arch.txt.
160. Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, (2000) SI 2000/692, at § 2(1)(d).
161. See The Accident Group Test Cases, [2003] 4 All E.R. para. 98, at 619-20.
162. See id. paras 141-54, at 628-30.
163. See id. paras 125, 130, at 625, 626.
164. Id. para. 107, at 622. Regardless of whether or not the CFA was enforceable, the
ATE insurance premium and other litigation costs were recoverable. See id. pa-
ras. 114-15, at 623-24.
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making will amount to a material breach of the requirements or mean that
the applicable conditions have not been sufficiently met.165
Additionally, defendants also challenged the enforceability of CFAs
when the legal representative had not complied with the client infor-
mation and care provisions of the Conditional Fee Agreements Regu-
lations of 2000. Part 4 of the Regulations of 2000 (the client-care
provision) required that a "legal representative" must explain CFAs
and ATE insurance to claimants. 16 6 Did the "legal representative"
have to be a solicitor? Since claims management firms orchestrated
the legal procedures, it was generally more cost efficient for them to
use their own lay agent to explain these procedures than to rely on a
solicitor, who may not have been assigned to the case. In one lower
court case during this period, English v. Clipson,167 Judge Wharton
found that "[tihe panel solicitor [who eventually would handle the
case] has no direct contact with the client before he signs up to the
CFA, the ATE policy or the CCA loan agreement."16s Rather, the em-
ployee of The Accident Group ("TAG"), "whom the solicitor has not in-
structed directly, about whose expertise the solicitor is entirely
ignorant, over whom the solicitor has no control, and, arguably, for
whom the solicitor has no responsibility" was the person who commu-
nicated with the client.169
In Sharratt v. London Central Bus Co. (No. 1),170 another TAG test
case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the legal representative need
not be a solicitor. Lord Justice Brooke affirmed the Chief Taxing
Master who had decided that it was the quality of the communicated
information that was important. He had written that "[qluestions
may arise as to whether the agent is competent to carry out the re-
quired tasks, or indeed if the task has actually been carried out com-
petently. These, however, are questions of quality which are not for
this judgment."17 1 Lord Brooke added, however, that there must still
be professional supervision of the agent:
[I]t is sufficient if we make it clear that it will be in theory permissible for a
solicitors' firm to delegate the performance of its regulation 4 duties to an
organisation like TAG, and for TAG to sub-delegate to its representatives, pro-
vided that in so doing the solicitor is not abandoning the supervisory responsi-
bilities required of him by Practice Rule 13.07 and the Guide to Professional
Conduct para. 3.07.172
165. Id. para. 109, at 622.
166. See Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, (2000) SI 2000/692, at § 4.




170. [2003] 1 All E.R. 353 (Sup. Ct. Costs Office 2002).
171. Id. para. 84, at 376.
172. Sharratt v. London Cent. Bus Co. Ltd. (The Accident Group Test Cases), [2003] 4
All E.R. 590 para. 216, at 642-43 (C.A.) [The Accident Group Test Cases].
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VII. CONCLUSION: A MOMENT OF REPOSE
It should not be surprising that such a dramatic shift in the fund-
ing of English. litigation ushered in such a contentious struggle. At
least with respect to routine traffic accident claims, the fundamental
shift from public to private funding and the ultimate cost shift from
claimants to defendant liability insurance companies initiated a con-
fused, quarrelsome, and bitter debate. Under the second revised liti-
gation system from 2000 to 2003, satellite litigation became the norm
as aggressive claims management firms (some of which were "ambu-
lance chasers"), solicitors, barristers, and defendant liability insur-
ance companies battled over principles and detail.
Still, the courts resolved a number of substantive issues. In deter-
mining the reasonableness of success uplifts in routine cases, courts
should examine them in a "global" way in order to assure that there
are available solicitors for this type of work. In examining the after-
the-event ("ATE") insurance premium, courts should deconstruct the
premium to make certain that only those amounts related to insur-
ance benefits are counted.
The courts have also answered some important procedural ques-
tions. On the one hand, it is hoped that prevailing parties will reveal
their conditional fee agreements ("CFAs"). On the other hand, only
material defects in a CFA's content or material noncompliance with
client care and disclosure provisions will render the CFA unenforce-
able and, therefore, nonrecoverable.
Finally, throughout the period from 2000 to 2003, the Civil Justice
Council, an advisory board with responsibility for overseeing and coor-
dinating the modernization of the civil justice system, focused on these
issues. Its membership includes senior judges, lawyers, consumer and
commercial representatives, legal advisers, and academics. In late
December 2001, the Council implemented the "Big Tent," a discussion
forum designed to include all interest groups and parties affected by
the costs issues. Its working groups, discussions, conferences, and
sponsored research have introduced an element of civility that has set
the mood for the current peace. 173
This Article does not suggest that the battle is over. Some future
disputes, for example, may implicate constitutional and human rights
issues. In King v. Telegraph Group Ltd.,1 74 the Court of Appeal had to
decide if a judge could issue an order capping costs in a defamation
lawsuit by a claimant with a CFA but no ATE insurance. Lord Justice
Brooke noted that "defamation proceedings, however, represent a po-
173. More information about the Civil Justice Council can be found on the Council's
website at http://www.costsdebate.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/Home.go (last visited
June 10, 2004).
174. [20041 EWCA Civ 613 (C.A.).
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tential infringement of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed
by ECHR Article 10(1)."175 Where freedom of expression is at issue, it
would be unfair to submit defendants to unlimited costs. The judge
recognized that such a result might infringe on a-claimant's opportu-
nity to instruct first-class counsel, but this would "be a small price to
pay" to eliminate the "chilling effect on a newspaper exercising its
right to freedom of expression."17 6
Still, there have been some important developments since early
summer 2003 that have helped to foster a moment of repose. These
developments are the introduction of simpler CFA regulations, the ab-
rogation of the indemnity principle, and the adoption of a predictable
cost system for routine traffic accident cases. Additionally, in June
2003, the Department for Constitutional Affairs sought wide consulta-
tion with an eye to further reform.
The Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments)
Regulations of 2003 ("CFA Regulations of 2003"), which went into ef-
fect in June 2003, deal with one set of problems by introducing a sim-
plified CFA.177 In those cases where the client would be liable to pay
175. Id. para. 96.
176. Id. paras. 99, 102.
177. Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations, (2003) SI
2003/1240. Section 2 of Regulation 2 provides:
(1) This regulation applies to a conditional fee agreement under which,
except in the circumstances set out in paragraph (5), the client is
liable to pay his legal representative's fees and expenses only to the
extent that sums are recovered in respect of the relevant proceed-
ings, whether by way of costs or otherwise.
(2) In determining for the purposes of paragraph (1) the circumstances
in which a client is liable to pay his legal representative's fees and
expenses, no account is to be taken of any obligation to pay costs in
respect of the premium of a policy taken out to insure against the
risk of incurring a liability in the relevant proceedings.
(3) Regulations 2, 3 and 4 do not apply to a conditional fee agreement to
which this regulation applies.
(4) A conditional fee agreement to which this regulation applies must-
(a) specify-
(i) the particular proceedings or parts of them to which it relates
(including whether it relates to any appeal, counterclaim or
proceedings to enforce a judgment or order); and
(ii) the circumstances in which the legal representative's fees
and expenses, or part of them, are payable; and
(b) if it provides for a success fee-
(i) briefly specify the reasons for setting the percentage increase
at the level stated in the agreement; and
(ii) provide that if, in court proceedings, the percentage increase
becomes payable as a result of those proceedings and the le-
gal representative or the client is ordered to disclose to the
court or any other person the reasons for setting the percent-
age increase at the level stated in the agreement, he may do
SO.
(5) A conditional fee agreement to which this regulation applies may
specify that the client will be liable to pay the legal representative's
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his solicitor's fees and expenses "only to the extent that sums are re-
covered in respect of the relevant proceedings, whether by way of costs
or otherwise," the CFA Regulations of 2000 will no longer apply.17 8
Instead, the simplified CFA modifies and abbreviates the required
content and streamlines the client-care and information provisions.
All that is necessary is that "the legal representative must inform the
client as to the circumstances in which the client may be liable to pay
the legal representative's fees and expenses, and provide such further
explanation, advice, or other information as to those circumstances as
the client may reasonably require."'179 Since the claimant's fee and
expense obligation is limited to recovered amounts, this reduced pro-
tection makes sense.
On June 29, 2004, the Department for Constitutional Affairs pub-
lished a report called Making Simple CFAs a Reality: A Summary of
Responses to the Consultation Paper Simplifying Conditional Fee
Agreements and Proposals for Reform.180 The report confesses error
with respect to earlier regulations. It states that although designed to
fees and expenses whether or not sums are recovered in respect of
the relevant proceedings, if the client-
(a) fails to co-operate with the legal representative;
(b) fails to attend any medical or expert examination or court hear-
ing which the legal representative reasonably requests him to
attend;
(c) fails to give necessary instructions to the legal representative; or
(d) withdraws instructions from the legal representative.
(6) Before a conditional fee agreement to which this regulation applies is
made, the legal representative must inform the client as to the cir-
cumstances in which the client may be liable to pay the legal repre-
sentative's fees and expenses, and provide such further explanation,
advice or other information as to those circumstances as the client
may reasonably require.
Id. at Reg. 2 § 2.
In addition, the Lord Chancellor issued an order to implement section 31 of
the Access to Justice Act of 1999, abrogating the indemnity principle. Access to
Justice Act 1999 (Commencement No. 10) Order, (2003) SI 2003/1241 art. 2. The
Civil Procedure Committee also amended Rule 43.2 to the same effect:
Where advocacy or litigation services are provided to a client under a
conditional fee agreement, costs are recoverable under Parts 44 to 48
notwithstanding that the client is liable to pay his legal representative's
fees and expenses only to the extent that sums are recovered in respect
of the litigation, whether by way of costs or otherwise.
... In [previous] paragraph . .. , the reference to a conditional fee
agreement is to an agreement which satisfies all conditions applicable to
it by virtue of section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules, (2003) SI 2003/1242 § 5.
178. Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations, (2003) SI
2003/1240 Reg. 2 § 2.
179. Id.
180. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, MAKING SIMPLE CFAS A REALITY: A SUMMARY
OF RESPONSES TO THE CONSULTATION PAPER SIMPLIFYING CONDITIONAL FEE
AGREEMENTS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2004) [hereinafter MAKING SIMPLE
CFAS A REALITY].
[Vol. 83:114
THE ENGLISH COSTS WAR
protect consumers, "It is now clear that the provisions have generally
played a limited role in this regard and have in practice only served to
make CFAs far too complex, less transparent and open to technical
challenges from defendants seeking to reduce their exposure to costs
or to avoid payment altogether."1 81
The CFA Regulations of 2003,182 as well as accompanying amend-
ments to the Civil Procedure Rules, also revoke the troublesome in-
demnity principle in complying CFA situations.1 8 3 The Explanatory
Note provides:
This in effect abrogates in relation to this type of conditional fee agreement
the so-called indemnity principle-the principle that the amount which can be
awarded to a party in respect of costs to be paid by him to his legal representa-
tives is limited to what would have been payable by him to them if he had not
been awarded costs. Solicitors will to this extent be able to agree lawfully with
their clients not to seek to recover by way of costs anything in excess of what the
court awards, or what it is agreed will be paid, and will no longer be prevented
from openly contracting with their clients on such terms. 1 8 4
Finally, in October 2003, pursuant to amendments to the Civil Pro-
cedure Rules, a predictable recoverable costs system became effective
for routine traffic accident cases that settled for less than £10,000.185
In those cases, the recoverable costs are fixed at £800 plus a percent-
age of damages in excess of £5,000. Additionally, claimants could re-
cover a limited set class of disbursements as well as an agreed upon
success fee.' 8 6 As of June 2004, the normal success fee in these cases
was set at 12.5 percent.' 8 7 More recently, fixed fees, or predictable
costs, have been extended to third-party employers' liability accident
claims. This may be the wave of the future. Welcoming the agree-
ment that made such an extension possible, the Chairman of the Civil
Justice Council, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Master of the
Rolls, stated:
181. Id. at 17.
182. Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations, (2003) SI
2003/1240.
183. The Department for Constitutional Affairs will also work to modify the indemnity
principle in other areas as well. See MAKING SIMPLE CFAs A REALITY, supra note
180, at 20-23.
184. Conditional Fee Agreements (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations, (2003) SI
2003/1240 (Explanatory Note) (emphasis added).
185. Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2003 sched. 2, pt. II, SI 2003/1242.
186. As with any regulatory arrangement there will, of course, be problems. What, for
example, constitutes a routine traffic accident case? Also, the scaled fees do not
include counsel's fees, disbursements (e.g., expenses), or the ATE premium. In
some cases, the new proposal may discourage quick settlements. Solicitors may
delay serious settlement discussion until after issuance of formal legal papers in
order to avoid the limited scaled fees. Only time will tell how difficult and con-
tentious the application of these new methods will be in practice.
187. Press Release, Department for Constitutional Affairs, Improvements to "No Win
No Fee" Arrangements for Personal Injury Claims (May 28, 2004) (available in
the Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law).
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This agreement extends the predictable costs scheme further, and maintains
welcome momentum. For a third time, senior representatives of both claim-
ant and defendant interests have managed to develop a workable solution to a
sensitive and contentious area of litigation, under the Civil Justice Council's
successful mediation model. 1 8 8
Finally, the Foreward to the Consultation Paper Simplifying CFAs
sets the tone for future developments, and hopefully, civil debate:
In April 2000 the Government made significant changes to the way in
which personal injury cases are funded by introducing recoverable success
fees and after-the-event (ATE) insurance premiums from opponents and re-
moving [personal injury cases] from legal aid scope (apart from in clinical neg-
ligence cases). This shift was designed to increase access to justice and strike
a fairer balance between claimants and defendants. Individuals who could
not afford to litigate privately, despite having good cases, were given the op-
portunity to do so more easily. Making a personal injury claim became no
longer the preserve of the wealthy or poor, but open to all with good cases.
The reforms also provided defendants with a fairer system in which they could
recover costs in successfully defended cases.
The reforms are now over three years old and we all need to think about
what we can learn from this period, whether the regime could be better de-
signed in the light of that experience and what further changes to secondary
legislation may be needed.189
This tone was continued in the Department's next consultation pa-
per, Making Simple CFAs a Reality.19o The report included draft reg-
ulations to simplify all CFAs. In addition, it called for still further
consultation with respect to all the issues discussed in this Article.
Before, however, ending on such a peaceful note, there is still am-
ple opportunity for contentious activity. For better or worse, there is
now rampant competition for claimants. Although this will certainly
be beneficial for some, the opportunities for abuse (of claimants, de-
fendants, and the system) are obvious. Some have claimed that there
is now a "compensation culture," fueled in good part by the aggressive
solicitation of law suits. The most active players will be the claims
management firms and competitive solicitors, and, if anything, their
activities will continue.
Claims management firms remain unregulated as a specific busi-
ness. In May 2003, the Parliamentary Secretary at the Lord Chancel-
lor's Department expressed an interest in possible abuses by overly
aggressive companies. t 9 1 She was also aware, however, that manage-
ment firms' competitive tactics and efficient operations provided many
188. Press Release, Department for Constitutional Affairs, A Third Success for the
Civil Justice Council in Bringing an End to the "Costs War" (June 8, 2004) (avail-
able in the Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law).
189. DEP'T FOR CONSTITrIONAL AFFAIRS, SIMPLIFYING CFAs (2003), available at http:/!
www.dca.gov.uk/consultlconfees/cfa.htm.
190. MAKING SIMPLE CFAS A REALITY, supra note 180.
191. Baroness Scotland of Asthal QC, Speech to the Association of Personal Injury
Lawyers Annual Conference (May 9, 2003), at http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/
2003/ps090503.htm.
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claimants easy access to the justice system. Speaking to a conference
of personal injury lawyers, the Secretary said:
Recent test cases have or are involving leading claims managers and as-
pects of their business models. I am though quite certain that provided claims
management companies and similar intermediaries act responsibly and with
probity they can expand access to justice for people with good claims and pro-
vide helpful claims management services to solicitors. While improper ap-
proaches to vulnerable people must be of concern, it is of equal importance
that people who may have been injured by others' negligence should have ac-
cess to help to seek compensation.
If individuals are to enforce their rights they need to be aware of the ways
in which they can enforce them. Marketing approaches, including advertis-
ing, provided it is not misleading or dishonest, assist in raising awareness.
1 9 2
Other reform groups are more insistent that there be greater con-
trol. The Better Regulation Task Force, in Better Routes to Redress,1 93
has called for the Office of Fair Trading to approve an industry spon-
sored Code of Practice that would spell out how claims management
firms should operate.194 The claims management business sector had
for too long been characterized by "hard-sell advertising and direct-
marketing which encouraged people to 'have a go' even if there was
little chance of actually achieving the large payout being dangled as
an inducement." 195 Also, they earned their money "by non-transpar-
ent and complex systems of referral fees and charges." 19 6 The Task
Force warned that if the industry could not develop a Code, then the
Department for Constitutional Affairs should regulate the
industry.197
Solicitors have begun to compete for clients, having developed ex-
pensive computerized systems for the handling of many claims. Solici-
tor firms have also engaged in extensive advertising, often cooperating
in order to present a united front against claims management firms.
One common advertising theme explains how solicitors are not Ameri-
can ambulance chasers, implying that management firms are. One
such firm explained, "The ambulance-chasing solicitor identifies the
client first and seeks to persuade them to sue. We identify the poten-
tial action ... and if we think there is a case, we say this to the public
at large."' 98 Other solicitors have begun an advertising campaign
that, among other things, provides for an advance on the recovered
192. Id.
193. BETTER REGULATION TASK FORCE, BETTER ROUTES TO REDRESS (2004).
194. Id. at 20.
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 20.
198. Nick Hilborne, PI Firms Seek Out Causes of Action, L. Soc'y GAZETTE (June 21,
1995), quoted in Abel, supra note 3, at 272.
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damages.1 99 There is once again serious discussion of a full-scale
adoption of the American-style contingent fee method of litigation
funding.20 0
Other solicitors have joined claims management firm panels in an
effort to assure a flow of clients. Chief Taxing Master Hurst examined
one aspect of this situation in Claims Direct (Tranche 2).201 As noted
supra, Claims Direct had required its panel solicitors to retain an af-
filiated company for litigation services. In other words, solicitors were
required to outsource this litigation work. Solicitors who represented
prevailing claimants tried to recover this disbursement. Master
Hurst, however, denied recoverability. He held that this disburse-
ment was a thinly disguised referral fee. As such, it was a clear viola-
tion of the Solicitor's Introduction and Referral Code that ethically
prohibited solicitors from rewarding "introducers by the payment of
commission or otherwise."2o 2 It was therefore unrecoverable. He
wrote:
It is quite clear that the £395 plus VAT is the price which the panel solicitor
must pay in order to obtain the work. If the panel solicitor is not prepared to
pay, the work goes elsewhere. This is not a question of client choice but of
MLSS effectively selling work to panel solicitors. Panel solicitors have the
option of rejecting a case, if for some reason they do not wish to take it on, but
if they do wish to take it on they cannot avoid having to pay the fixed
price. 2 0 3
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Chief Taxing Master on May 20,
2004 in Sharratt v. London Central Bus Company (No. 2): The Acci-
dent Group Test Cases.2o4 Lord Justice Buxton wrote that the follow-
ing factors supported the Master's conclusion:
199. See A Norfolk Law Firm is Aiming to Shake Up the Troubled Personal Injury
Industry with its "Revolutionary" New Ethical Scheme, E. DAILY PRESS, June 12,
2003.
200. See BETTER REGULATION TASK FORCE, supra 193, at 29.
201. Claims Direct Test Cases (Tranche 2), para. 80 (Sup. Ct. Costs Office Jan. 3,
2003), at http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j1953/claimsdirect_
tranche_2.htm.
202. THE LAw SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS An-
nex llB (8th ed. 1999) (Introduction and Referral Code of 1990), available at
http://www.guide-on-line.lawsociety.org.uk/ [hereinafter THE LAw SOCIETY,
GUIDE]. The Code provides:
(3) Solicitors must not reward introducers by the payment of commis-
sion or otherwise....
(4) Solicitors should not allow themselves to become so reliant on a Lim-
ited number of sources of referrals that the interests of an introducer
affect the advice given by the solicitor to the clients.
(5) Solicitors should be particularly conscious of the need to advise im-
partially and independently clients referred by introducers. They
should ensure that the wish to avoid offending the introducer does
not colour the advice given to such clients.
Id. at § 2(3)-(5).
203. Claims Direct (Tranche 2), para. 83.
204. [2004] 3 All E.R. 325 (C.A.).
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i. The fee was compulsory for any solicitor wishing to be sent cases by TAG.
It was not open for him to make other arrangements for investigation
work.
ii. The amount of the fee was standard in all cases.
iii. . . . [T]he amount of the fee far outstripped any reasonable charge for the
work done. 2 0
5
These decisions, however, may not impede solicitors efforts to gain
clients, either through claims management firms or directly. The
Blackwell Committee had recommended that the Law Society recon-
sider its referral rules so solicitors could compete on a level playing
field in personal injury work and take account of commercial business
development practices. 206 In particular the Committee referenced the
ban on referral fees, saying the public might benefit from a system
that encouraged unqualified persons to refer cases to specialist solici-
tors. 207 The Committee stressed, however, the importance of referral
fees being disclosed:
The Law Society should reconsider its Practice Rule barring payment for re-
ferrals, in the light of the activities in the personal injury market of claims
management companies and their panel solicitors. We consider that the pub-
lic interest might well benefit from a system that encouraged non-qualified
persons to refer cases to qualified persons or less specialist solicitors to refer
to more specialist ones. However, where such a relationship existed, this
should be made clear to the consumer, to whom details of all referral fees
should be disclosed, and any charges made transparent. These are matters
within the jurisdiction of the self-regulated professions but we conclude that it
would be timely for these bodies to give close examination to the need to level
the playing field so that the self-regulated professions can compete more
freely with the non-qualified section.2 0 8
205. Id. para. 41, at 335.
206. See BLACKWELL, supra note 70, para. 37.
207. In fact, there have been long-standing debates over the propriety of referral fee
rules. For example, one Law Society working group, suggested eliminating the
ban in 2001:
Solicitors face growing competition from other professions and busi-
nesses offering the same services as solicitors, e.g. in the field of finan-
cial services, and from the growing number of client referral services
such as 'claims management' companies. Often these other providers
can pay for referrals. This could mean that members of the public re-
quiring these services are less likely to be referred to a solicitor. There is
a public interest in competition between providers and it is in the inter-
ests of both the public and the profession for solicitors to be able to com-
pete on a level playing field. This has been recognised by the
Government.
REGULATION REVIEW WORKING PARTY, LAW Soc'Y OF ENG. & WALES, CONSULTA-





208. BLACKWELL, supra note 70, para. 150 (citation omitted).
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In March 2003, The Law Society's Council liberalized its rules and
amended the Solicitors' Introduction and Referral Code of 1990 by ad-
ding a new Section 2A.209 These new rules level the playing field so
that solicitors can both cooperate and compete with claims manage-
ment firms. 2
10
There is a moment of repose in the costs war. While the first "guer-
rilla war" cast claimants, including their solicitors and ATE insurance
companies, against defendant liability insurance companies, the next
set of contentious issues may focus on competitive issues between
claims management firms and solicitors, including whether England
should permit claimants to fund litigation with an American-style con-
tingent fee.
209. The new Section 2A to the Solicitors' Introduction and Referral Code of 1990
provides:
Section 2A: Payments for referrals
(1) A solicitor must not make any payment to a third party in relation to
the introduction of clients to the solicitor, except as permitted below.
(2) Solicitors may enter into agreements under this Section for referrals
of clients with introducers who undertake in such agreements to
comply with the terms of this Code.
(3) A solicitor may make a payment to a third party introducer only
where immediately upon receiving the referral and before accepting
instructions to act the solicitor provides the client with all relevant
information concerning the referral and, in particular, the amount of
any payment.
(4) The solicitor must also be satisfied that the introducer:
(a) has provided the client with all information relevant to the client
concerning the referral before the referral took place and, in par-
ticular, the amount of any payment;
(b) has not acquired the client as a consequence of marketing or pub-
licity or other activities which, if done by a solicitor, would be in
breach of any of the Solicitor's Practice Rules and in particular by
"cold calling"; and
(c) does not, under the arrangement, influence or constrain the solic-
itor's professional judgement in relation to the advice given to the
client.
(5) If the solicitor has reason to believe that the introducer is breaching
terms of the agreement required by this Section the solicitor must
take all reasonable steps to procure that the breach is remedied. If
the introducer persists in breaches the solicitor must terminate the
agreement in respect of future referrals.
(6) A solicitor must not make a referral payment if at the time of the
referral the solicitor intends to act for that person with the benefit of
legal aid, or in any criminal proceedings.
(7) For the purpose of sub-section (1) above, a payment includes any
other consideration but does not include normal hospitality, proper
disbursements or normal business expenses.
THE LAw SOCIETY, GUIDE, supra note 202.
210. Rachel Rothwell, Fee-Sharing and Referrel Fees Given Green Light, L. Soc'y GA-
ZETTE (March 12, 2004), available at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/archive
articleframe.asp?ArticleName=/Gazettearchive/2004-03-12/29arch.txt.
